



The sAkshi-pratyaksha of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna



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यत्साक्षात्सच्चिदानन्दं प्रत्यगद्वयमक्रियम् ।
तन्नमामि नृसिंहस्य योगिगम्यं परं पदम् ॥

Preface

Advaita Vedanta, as expounded in the unparalleled and epoch-making commentaries of Shri Adi Shankaracharya, represents the pinnacle of Upanishadic wisdom. Focused on establishing the non-duality of the Atman, Acharya Shankara briefly introduced numerous subtle concepts in His writings, which were further elucidated by the great thinkers of his lineage. These preceptors have provided profound insights into Shankara's commentaries, thereby establishing a firm foundation for the philosophical dimension of Vedanta. Their contributions significantly shaped the Advaita tradition, giving rise to three major schools of interpretation: the Vartika, Vivarana, and Bhamati traditions. The culmination of the Vivarana views is seen in Advaita Siddhi, a celebrated work that played a pivotal role in defending Shankaracharya's Advaita philosophy against persistent intellectual attacks from dualist schools. Among the key concepts in Vedanta, adhyasa and avidya are of paramount importance. A clear understanding of these fundamentals is essential to grasp the essence and profundity of Shankaracharya's teachings.

However, the nature of avidya has become a contentious issue among modern seekers of Vedanta. Traditional schools of interpretation describe avidya as an abhava-vilakshana entity, considering it the material cause of adhyasa. On the other hand, scholars who restrict themselves exclusively to Shankaracharya's commentaries

reject the notion of avidya as a positive entity. Instead, they define it as jnana-abhava, mithya-jnana, or samshaya-jnana. These critics argue that the bhavarupa mulavidya proposed by post-Shankara preceptors distorts the commentator's views. In light of this ongoing debate, it is crucial to study the relevant sections of these texts with an unbiased and discerning mind. The nature of avidya becomes evident through an in-depth analysis of its perception. The ingenuity of ideas and the irrefutable reasoning presented in these seminal works not only offer valuable insights into avidya but also highlight the richness of traditional scholarship while revealing the flaws in opposing positions. However, the intricate philosophical Sanskrit used in these texts may challenge readers unfamiliar with the language.

In his exposition, Shri Sudhanshu Shekhar Ji meticulously addresses the key concepts related to avidya-prateeti. His remarkable coherence and clarity in explanation, evident in all his articles, stand out prominently in this work as well. Popular among the members of online Advaita forums, Sudhanshu Ji is regarded as a dedicated adherent to the Advaita Sampradaya and has contributed several scholarly articles to his blog. Having engaged with him for more than five years on a variety of topics related to Vedanta, I have always been deeply impressed by his erudition. It is truly commendable that he has taken up the challenging task of translating complex technical terms from texts like Advaita Siddhi and elucidating them in simple language. This article promises to be an extremely useful resource for readers, offering

pristine clarity and resolving lingering doubts or misconceptions about the nature and perception of avidya.

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Introduction

While the Upanishads proclaim jnAna of Brahman to be the only means to mOksha, they also, in the same breath, mention Brahman to be one's own Self and swa-prakAsha. Now, being one's own Self and also swa-prakAsha, one's Brahman-hood should have stood illuminated to oneself. However, it is a matter of experience that one's Brahman-hood is not manifest to oneself. This cannot be explained unless a bhAvarUpa-AvaraNa covering the swa-prakAsha Brahman is admitted. Just as a luminous lamp cannot remain unilluminated to a person near it unless there is a bhAvarUpa AvaraNa, similarly, the non-illumination of the swarUpa of Brahman cannot be explained without a bhAvarUpa AvaraNa. This is explained by the omniscient Rigveda in 10.82.7 -

न तं विदाथ य इमा जजानान्यद्युष्माकमन्तरं बभूव । नीहारेण प्रावृता जल्प्या चासुतृप उक्थशासश्चरन्ति ॥

Such bhAvarUpa AvaraNa is stated in Shruti and Smriti as ajnAna or avidyA and the material cause of this entire perceived magical duality. The entire anAtmA is born from this ajnAna. However, jnAna emanating from mahAvAkya sublates this ajnAna and the swarUpa of Brahman then stands illuminated to oneself. That is mOksha.

This write-up presents the explanation of perception of ajnAna by sAkshI as discussed in VArtika, VivaraNa, VivaraNa Prameya Sangraha, Advaita DIpikA, Advaita Siddhi, SiddhAnta Bindu and LaghuchandrikA. The concepts elucidated are vital in having

correct understanding of ajnAna-pratyaksha. Incidentally, the ideas of jnAna-abhAva and its distinction with bhAvarUpa-ajnAna have also been discussed which will remove the misconceptions of some sincere seekers who tend to equate ajnAna with jnAna-abhAva.

Though the language used in this write-up is quite Sanskrita-nishTha, I feel it should remain so for clearer conception. The concepts are usually more difficult to understand when translated into English. I have retained the basic Sanskrit words and in some cases a set of words, which can be easily understood by using online LLM resources. I am sure that with a little bit of effort, one can understand the arguments presented.

I am indebted to Dr. Rahul Sarkhel of IIT Kanpur who has been a constant support in my quest of understanding advaita vedAnta. I also extend my heartfelt thanks to him for adorning this document by writing the preface.

I am also indebted to Shri Lalitaalaalita Swamiji and to Shri Venkatraghavan S ji whose guidance from time-to-time proved invaluable to me while writing this note. I extend my heartfelt thanks to both of them.

I hope that this document will be useful to sincere seekers.

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ajnAna-pratyaksha-vichArah

The lakshaNa of ajnAna have been explained by Chitsukhacharya as “अनादिभावरूपं यद्विज्ञानेन विलीयते। तदज्ञानमिति प्राज्ञा लक्षणं संप्रचक्षते॥”. Thus, ajnAna is bhAvarUpa, anAdi and is sublated by Atma-jnAna. Without such bhAvarUpa ajnAna acting as an AvaraNa, the vyavahAra “nAsti, na prakAshate” with respect to swaprakAsha-Brahman is not possible. It is seen that wherever there is pushkala-kAraNa for illumination of something such as a pot in the form of “asti, prakAshate” **and** there is no AvaraNa, the pot appears illuminating. Therefore, when there is pushkala-kAraNa for the vyavahAra of “asti, prakAshate” for swaprakAsha-Brahman, the vyavahAra “nAsti, na prakAshate” with respect to it cannot be explained without accepting a bhAvarUpa AvaraNa, which is avidyA. This is clear from arthApatti as explained by VivaraNa at page 60 - “अस्ति, प्रकाशते” इत्याद्यभिज्ञादिव्यवहारं प्रति पुष्कलकारणे सति--“नास्ति न प्रकाशते च” इति योऽयं आत्मतत्त्वालम्बनो व्यवहारः, सः भावरूपेण केनचित् आत्मनि आवरणमन्तरेण नोपपद्यते; सति पुष्कलकारणे असति च आवरणे, सन्निहिते घटे “प्रकाशते” इत्यादिव्यवहारदर्शनात्, अतो “नास्ति ब्रह्म, न प्रकाशते च” इति व्यवहारः अन्यथानुपपत्त्या भावरूपमज्ञानं गमयति इति अर्थापत्तिः अनुमानं वा समुदायार्थः।

2. ajnAna is different from jnAna-abhAva, mithyA-jnAna and mithyA-jnAna-samskAra

Opponent: The word ajnAna is made by combining नञ् with ज्ञान. If we take the meaning of नञ् as abhAva, then ajnAna will refer to jnAna-abhAva. If we take the meaning of नञ् as virOdhi, then ajnAna will refer to jnAna-virOdhi i.e. mithyA-jnAna. And if bheda is the meaning of नञ्, then ajnAna will refer to mithyA-jnAna-samskAra i.e. samskAra which gives rise to mithyA-jnAna. Either of the three can obstruct the illumination of Brahman and can ensure the vyavahAra "नास्ति न प्रकाशते च". Therefore, there is no need to imagine a bhAvarUpa-ajnAna. [VivaraNa Prameya Sangraha: page 71-72]. VivaraNa says on page 62 - ननु अग्रहण-मिथ्याज्ञान-तत्संस्कारेभ्यः अन्यत् अज्ञानं नाम न पश्यामः, त एव च जीवस्य स्वयंप्रकाशमानमपि ब्रह्मस्वरूपावभासं प्रतिबध्नन्ति इति. [VivaraNa uses the word अग्रहण which is same as jnAna-abhAva].

Answer: Not so. On account of the fact that there is non-illumination of Brahman in sushupti.

2.1 Now, someone may argue that jIva and Brahman are different. And just as jnAna-of-jIva-2 does not stand illuminated to jIva-1, similarly swarUpa-jnAna-of-Brahman does not stand illuminated to jIva. That is to say, just as there is non-illumination of purushAntara-jnAna to a purusha, similarly, there is

non-illumination of self-luminous Brahman to jIva. **However, this cannot be said because jIva and Brahman are one in sushupti.** न तावत् सुषुप्तादौ स्वयम्प्रकाशब्रह्मस्वरूपानवभासः पुरुषान्तरसंवेदनवत् द्रष्टृभिन्नत्वात् इति शक्यं वक्तुम्; एकत्वश्रुतेः। (VivaraNa, p. 62)

2.2 Now, let us take each alternative presented by the opponent one-by-one.

1. Firstly, mithyA-jnAna cannot be pratibandhaka in illumination of Brahman in sushupti, because mithyA-jnAna itself is absent in sushupti. नापि मिथ्याज्ञानप्रतिबन्धात्; तत्र तस्य अभावात्। (VivaraNa, p. 63)

2. Further, mithyA-jnAna-samskAra just cannot be pratibandhaka, because mithyA-jnAna-samskAra is never an obstruction to tattva-avabhAsa. It is seen in the world that despite there being rajata-bhrama-samskAra which is a mithyA-jnAna-samskAra, there is tattva-avabhAsa in the form of shuklikA-jnAna. नापि तत्संस्कारप्रतिबन्धात्; भ्रान्तिसंस्काराणां तत्त्वावभासप्रतिबन्धकत्वाभावात्, सत्स्वपि रजतभ्रमसंस्कारेषु शुक्तिकावबोधदर्शनात्। (VivaraNa, p. 63)

3. Further, jnAna-abhAva i.e. agrahaNa can never be pratibandhaka. This is on account of following reasons:

- If swarUpa-jnAna-abhAva is meant by jnAna-abhAva, then swarUpa-jnAna being nitya, there can never be its abhAva.
- If jnAna-abhAva other than swarUpa-jnAna-abhAva is meant by jnAna-abhAva, then that is not capable of obstructing swaprakAsha-Brahma-tattva-avabhAsa. Otherwise, there would be contingency of obstruction even in mukti. **VivaraNa Prameya Sangraha**

says on page 73-न तावत् स्वरूपज्ञानस्य नित्यस्य अभावः संभवति। अन्यज्ञानाभावस्तु न स्वयंप्रकाश-ब्रह्मतत्त्व-अवभास-प्रतिबन्ध-क्षमः अन्यथा मुक्तौ-अपि प्रतिबन्धप्रसङ्गात्।

VivaraNa explains the same on page 63 - नापि अग्रहणप्रतिबन्धात्; स्वरूपग्रहणस्य नित्यत्वात्, स्वयंप्रकाशमाने संवेदने तद्विषयकादाचित्काग्रहणस्य अप्रतिबन्धकत्वात्. **RijuvivaraNa** explains on page 63 - “अग्रहणमि”ति स्वरूपग्रहणाभावः? कदाचिद् ग्रहणाभावो वा? इति विकल्प्य प्रथमपक्षं दूषयति - स्वरूपग्रहणस्य इति। न द्वितीय इति आह - स्वयंप्रकाशमान इति। तद्विषय-अग्रहणे विद्यमाने अपि स्वरूप-ग्रहण-प्रयुक्त-व्यवहार-दर्शनात् इति भावः। The logic adduced is as follows - agrahaNa can be either swarUpa-grahaNa-abhAva or kadAchid-grahaNa-abhAva. The former is impossible on account of swarUpa-jnAna being nitya. The latter is not possible either. This is so because even when there is agrahaNa of vishaya-of-swaprakAsha-Brahman i.e. objects, there is vyavahAra arising on account of swarUpa-grahaNa. This is the example of vyavahAra in mukti. kadAchid-agrahaNa is common to mukti and sushupti. In mukti, despite there being swarUpa-grahaNa-prayukta-vyavahAra, there is grahaNa-abhAva of vishaya-of-swaprakAsha-Brahman. If mere kadAchid-grahaNa-abhAva were to be the pratibandhaka of swaprakAsha-Brahman, then in mukti also, like sushupti, there would have been non-illumination. But it is seen that there is swarUpa-grahaNa in mukti. Hence, kadAchid-grahaNa-abhAva cannot be pratibandhaka either.

VivaraNa-upanyAsa says on page 50 - ननु अज्ञानप्रयुक्तमावरणमस्तु, अज्ञानं तु अग्रहण-मिथ्याज्ञान-तत्संस्कार-कर्मभ्योऽन्यद् न पश्याम इति चेद् ? न । सुषुप्तावात्माऽनवभासानुपपत्तेः; न हि स्वयम्प्रकाशस्यात्मनो जडाया मनोवृत्तेर्ग्रहणशब्दिताया अभावेन अनवभासो युक्तः, खद्योताभावेनेव सवितुः । न

सुषुप्तौ भ्रान्तिरस्ति । नापि संस्कारः आवरकः, भ्रान्तिसंस्कारे सत्यपि शुक्तितत्त्वावभासदर्शनात्। The logic adduced is as under - grahaNa word is used to refer to jaDa manO-vritti. By agrahaNa, it would mean manO-vritti-abhAva. By such abhAva, the non-illumination of Brahman is not possible. It is akin to saying that there is non-illumination of sun on account of absence of fireflies.

2.3 This is also explained by BhagvAn BhAshyakAra when He says in GIItA 13.2 - तामसो हि प्रत्ययः, आवरणात्मकत्वात् अविद्या विपरीतग्राहकः, संशयोपस्थापको वा, अग्रहणात्मको वा ; विवेकप्रकाशभावे तदभावात् , तामसे च आवरणात्मके तिमिरादिदोषे सति अग्रहणादेः अविद्यात्रयस्य उपलब्धिः ॥

When there is a defect in the nature of tAmasika-AvaraNa such as timira-etc-defect, then there is perception of three types of avidyA namely agrahaNa, samshaya-upasthApaka and viparIta-grAhaka. That is to say, when there is AvaraNa, then there is agrahaNa, viparIta-jnAna and samshaya-jnAna. This clearly shows that AvaraNAtmaka-ajnAna is different from agrahaNa, mithyA-jnAna and its samskAra. It is like blindfolding a person. When he is so blindfolded, he cannot see (agrahaNa/jnAna-abhAva), he can doubt a coconut tree for a palm tree (samshaya-jnAna) or even take a palm tree for coconut tree (viparIta-jnAna). avidyA stands here for blindfold-cloth which results in jnAna-abhAva, viparIta-jnAna and samshaya-jnAna.

Therefore, by the reasoning adduced hereinabove, it is clear that ajnAna is bhAvarUpa and is different from jnAna-abhAva (agrahaNa), mithyA-jnAna and mithyA-jnAna-samskAra.

Thus, the opponent, who is a sarva-sankara-vAdI, is refuted.

PanchapAdikA says: अज्ञानमिति च जडात्मिका अविद्याशक्तिः ज्ञानपर्युदासेन उच्यते । ParyudAsa of x refers to, “like-x but different-from-x” i.e. “x-सदृश but x-भिन्न”. For e.g. in a ritual, when someone says “bring अब्राह्मण”, one does not bring a lump of clay. Rather one brings a human being who is not brAhmin. This is what is referred to as paryudAsa, as non-Brahmin human being is Brahmin-sadrisha but Brahmin-bhinna. Similarly, ajnAna is jnAna-sadrisha but jnAna-virOdhl. The sAdrishya is in the respect of bhAvarUpatva.

[Naishkarmya Siddhi, p. 245-246]

3. ajnAna is sAkshi-bhAsya

ajnAna is not pramAtri-gamya. This is so because ajnAna is removed by pramANa. ajnAna is, rather, sAkshi-bhAsya. That is to say, its pratyaksha is by sAkshI and not by pramAtA.

The following are the three types of sAkshi-pratyaksha:

- सामान्यतः साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष in the form of अहमज्ञो, माम्-अन्यं च न जानामि.
- विशेषतः साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष in the form of त्वदुक्तमर्थं संख्यां वा शास्त्रार्थं वा न जानामि.
- सौषुप्तसाक्षिप्रत्यक्ष evident from the parAmarsha in the form of एतावन्तं कालं सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्.

PanchapAdikA says “अवश्यमेषा अविद्याशक्तिः बाह्याध्यात्मिकेषु वस्तुषु तत्स्वरूपसत्तामात्रानुबन्धिनी अभ्युपगन्तव्या”. VivaraNa explains that by the word “अवश्यम्”, anumAna is shown whereas by the word “एषा”, pratyaksha is shown. However, the pramANa are not for knowing avidyA per se, as it is sAkshi-bhAsya, but to know bhAvarUpatva-anAditva-jnAna-nivartyatva-vishishTa-ajnAna. These qualifier dharmAs are not sAkshi-bhAsya. They are pramANa-gamya. Thus, asat-vyAvritti-vishishTa-ajnAna is pramANa-gamya whereas jnAna-virOdhitva-savishayakatva-vishishTa-ajnAna is sAkshi-bhAsya. Advaita Siddhi says - ननु-प्रमाणागम्यायामविद्यायां प्रमाणोपन्यासवैयर्थ्यम्, न च प्रमाणैरसद्व्यावृत्तिमात्रं बोध्यत इति वाच्यम्; अज्ञानमगृह्यतां तत्रासद्व्यावृत्तिबोधेऽप्यसामर्थ्यादिति-चेन्न; प्रमाणोपनीतासद्व्यावृत्तिविशिष्टज्ञानं हि साक्षिणा गृह्यते । तथा चासद्व्यावृत्त्युपनयने प्रमाणानां चरितार्थत्वात् न काप्यनुपपत्तिः ॥

Objection: Still Advaita Siddhi states - तत्र चाज्ञाने 'अहमज्ञौ मामन्यं च न जानामी'ति प्रत्यक्षं, 'त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामी'ति विशेषतः प्रत्यक्षम्, 'एतावन्तं कालं सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिष'मिति परामर्शसिद्धं सौषुप्तप्रत्यक्षं च प्रमाणम् । How can it use the word pramANa?

Answer: The word pramANa here is used in the following sense - येन विना यस्य असत्त्व-शङ्का न निवर्तते, सति च तस्मिन् निवर्तते, तत् तस्मिन् प्रमाणम्... अज्ञानस्य च असत्त्व-शङ्का 'अहमज्ञ' इत्यादि प्रत्यक्षेण एव निवर्तते इति प्रत्यक्षमेव साक्ष्यात्मकं तत्र प्रमाणम्. (Advaita DipikA). Since the doubt of asattva of ajnAna is removed by ajnAna-pratyaksha, it is called a pramANa and not because it is being known by a pramAtA.

Objection: What is the difference between pramANa-jnAna and sAkshi-jnAna?

Answer: pramANa is ajnAta-jnApakam. It makes an unknown object known. It never makes a known object known. Thus, “unknown-object known as unknown” and “known-object known as known” is not by pramANa but by sAkshI. Thus, unknown-object is known by sAkshI अज्ञाततया whereas known-object is known by sAkshI ज्ञाततया. That is why VivaraNa says – अत एव सर्वं वस्तु ज्ञाततयाज्ञाततया च साक्षिचैतन्यस्य विषय. ajnAna is illuminated by sAkshI, it can never be removed by sAkshI. ajnAna is removed by pramANa(-vritti-pratibimbata-chaitanya).

BAlabOdhinI elaborates this on page 1116 - प्रमाणसाक्षिणोरिदं वैलक्षण्यम् - प्रमाणेन-अज्ञात-अर्थ-सिद्धिः भवति, साक्षिणा तु अज्ञातं वस्तु अज्ञाततया एव, ज्ञातं वस्तु ज्ञाततया एव सिध्यति. प्रमा तु अज्ञान-निवर्तिका, साक्षिप्रत्यक्षं न अज्ञान-निवर्तकम्. अज्ञान-साधकस्य साक्षिणः अज्ञान-निवर्तकत्व-अयोगात्.

Thus, basically - प्रमाणेन प्रमेयं प्रमितं भवति, साक्षिणा तु साक्ष्यं सिद्धं भवति इति एव, न तु प्रमितम्।

(BALabOdhinI p. 1116)

3.1 Analysis of अहमज्ञः

अहमज्ञः is an example of सामान्यतः साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष. It is stated as sAmAnyatah because specific vishaya is not stated as the vishaya of ignorance. This pratyaksha shows avidyA as located in Atman and as pervading external objects such as pot and internal objects such as ahamkAra. VPS p. 53 says - जडात्मिकाया अविद्याशक्तेः आत्मानम्-आश्रित्य बाह्य-आध्यात्मिकेषु व्याप्ताया अनुभूयमानत्वात्।

VivaraNa analyses this experience at page 50 onwards. It says - ननु ज्ञानाभावविषयः अयमवभासः, न; अपरोक्षावभासत्वात् अहं सुखी इतिवत्, अभावस्य च षष्ठप्रमाणगोचरत्वात्, प्रत्यक्षाभाववादिनोऽपि न आत्मनि विज्ञानाभावावगमः सम्भवति; "मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति" इति प्रतिपत्तौ आत्मनि धर्मिणि प्रतियोगिनि वा अर्थे अवगते तत्र ज्ञानसद्भावात् ज्ञानाभावप्रतिपत्त्ययोगात्, अनवगतेऽपि धर्म्यादौ सुतरां अभावानवगमात्।

Objection: But this anubhava in the form of अहमज्ञः doesn't have ajnAna as the vishaya. Rather, it has jnAna-abhAva as the vishaya.

Answer: No. That cannot be the case. Just as "अहं सुखी" "अहं दुःखी" are aparOksha-jnAna, similarly "अहम् अज्ञः" is also an aparOksha-jnAna. On the other hand, jnAna-abhAva is an abhAva. And hence is always a vishaya of parOksha-jnAna. abhAva is known by either arthApatti-anumAna/vyatirekI-anumAna or anupalabdhi pramANa. These are non-pratyaksha. Therefore, the jnAna of jnAna-abhAva would be parOksha-jnAna whereas jnAna in the form of "अहम् अज्ञः" is an aparOksha-jnAna. Therefore, "अहम् अज्ञः" cannot have jnAna-abhAva as the vishaya.

Those, such as NaiyAyikAs, who hold that abhAva-jnAna is a pratyaksha-jnAna, cannot account for jnAna of jnAna-abhAva in AtmA. Because any abhAva-jnAna necessarily requires pratiyOgI-jnAna and dharmI-jnAna. Now, with pratiyOgI-jnAna and dharmI-jnAna being present in order to have jnAna of jnAna-abhAva, the very jnAna-abhAva can no longer be present. However, we do have the jnAna in the form of “अहम् अज्ञः”. Thus, jnAna-abhAva cannot be the vishaya of this anubhava, even if abhAva-jnAna is accepted to be a pratyaksha-jnAna.

Further, this logic applies with equal force when jnAna-abhAva is argued to be a vishaya of anupalabdhi pramANa or anumAna pramANa. षष्ठप्रमाणगोचरे फललिङ्गाभावानुमेयेऽपि ज्ञानाभावे, आत्मादौ अवगते अनवगतेऽपि आत्मनि ज्ञानाभावप्रतिपत्त्ययोगात्। Therefore, jnAna-abhAva cannot be the vishaya of pratIti “अहम् अज्ञः”.

However, in case of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna-pratyaksha, despite pratiyOgI-jnAna and anuyoga-jnAna being present, there is no incongruence as the vishaya ajnAna is not abhAva but bhAvarUpa.भावरूपाज्ञानप्रत्यक्षवादे तु सत्यपि आश्रयप्रतियोगिज्ञाने ज्ञानाभावस्येव भावान्तरस्यापि न अनुपपत्तिः नियन्तुं शक्यते। Tattva-DIpana, p.51, explains - भाव-अभाव-योः खलु एककालत्वं विरुद्धम्, न तु भावयोः; न हि घटभावे पटभाव-अनुपपत्तिः इत्यर्थः।

Thus, in the case of ajnAna-pratyaksha, even if anuyogI-jnAna and pratiyOgI-jnAna are present, there is no contradiction. The Ashraya of ajnAna, the vishaya of ajnAna and ajnAa itself, these three are illuminated by sAkshI. आश्रय-विषय-अज्ञानानि त्रीणि अपि एकेन-एव

साक्षिणा अवभास्यन्ते। (VPS, p.55) Just as sAkshI establishes Ashraya and vishaya of ajnAna, it also establishes ajnAna. It does not remove it. ajnAna is removed not by sAkshI but by pramANa (-vritti-pratibimbata-chaitanya). तथा च आश्रय-विषयौ साधयन्-अयं साक्षी तद्वत् एव अज्ञानमपि साधयति एव, न तु निवर्तयति। तन्निवर्तकं तु अन्तःकरणवृत्तिज्ञानमेव। (VPS, p.55) VivaraNa p.52 says - न च आश्रयप्रतियोगिज्ञानभूतमपि साक्षिचैतन्यं भावान्तरस्य अज्ञानस्य निवर्तकम्; तस्य अज्ञानविषयप्रतिभासत्वात्। न हि स्वज्ञानेनैव स्वयं निवर्तते। Because the sAkshI illuminates ajnAna, it can never remove ajnAna. The logic can be adduced as under - साक्षी न अज्ञान-निवर्तकम्, तत्-स्फोरकत्वात्, यद् यतस्फोरकं न तत् तन्निवर्तकम्, यथा घटज्ञानम्। Pot is perceived because of pot-jnAna, and hence pot-jnAna cannot negate pot. Similarly, ajnAna is perceived because of sAkshI. Therefore, sAkshi can never remove ajnAna. (घट-ज्ञानेन घटस्य-अपि निवृत्तिप्रसङ्गात्, Tattva DIpana, p.52)

Objection: When I say that I am ignorant of pot, then pot appears as a vyAvartaka, a qualifier of ajnAna. You said that the vyAvartaka-vishaya of ajnAna is also sAkshI-bhAsya just as ajnAna is sAkshI-bhAsya. But this is impossible. Because any vishaya-siddhi is dependent on pramANa. That is not present. Hence, ajnAna-vyAvartaka-vishaya cannot be illuminated by sAkshI. (VivaraNa p.52, ननु अज्ञानस्य व्यावर्तको विषयः कथं साक्षिचैतन्येन अवभास्यते प्रमाणाद्यत्तत्वात् विषयसिद्धेः इति.)

Answer: I will further refine your question. Let us analyse: whether sAkshI illumines pot-vishishTa-ajnAna or only-ajnAna! Now, only-ajnAna is never experienced by anyone. It is always vishaya-vyAvritta-ajnAna that is experienced. So, obviously, the second one

cannot be the case. That is to say, sAkshI-chaitanya cannot illuminate only-ajnAna under any circumstance. Further, if one says that sAkshI-chaitanya illuminates pot-vishishTa-ajnAna, then pot being visheshaNā of ajnAna, it must also be illuminated. However, pot-illumination is dependent on pramANa. Since pramANa is not present, pot-jnAna cannot be there. And in the absence of pot-jnAna, pot-vishishTa-ajnAna cannot be known either. Therefore, the first option is also impossible. Thus, sAkshI cannot illumine pot-vishishTa-ajnAna. And as said earlier, only-ajnAna is never experienced. (Tattva DIpana p.52 - किं सक्षिचैतन्यं घट-विशेषित-अज्ञानं भासयति? उत् केवलम् (अज्ञानम्)? न आद्यः, विषयस्य (घटस्य) प्रमाण-गम्यत्व-नियमात्, अन्यथा-प्रमाण-वैयर्थ्यात् [विषयस्य घटस्य प्रमाणाभावे अप्रकाशे घट-विशेषित-अज्ञानस्य साक्षिणा प्रकाशः अनुपपन्नः इति भावः]। न इतरः, अज्ञानम् इति अप्रतीतेः इति अर्थः [केवलस्य अज्ञानस्य कदाचिदपि प्रकाशः एव न भवति इति भावः]।)

This is the sum and substance of your objection. Also, another objection can be raised. That is the following: only-ajnAna is not sAkshI-bhAsya. So, how can pot-vishishTa-ajnAna be sAkshI-bhAsya!!

The answer is the following. There is no rule that if only-x is not sAkshI-bhAsya, then y-vishishTa-x cannot be sAkshI-bhAsya. Therefore, even if only-pot is not sAkshi-bhAsya or only-ajnAna is not sAkshi-bhAsya, still, pot-vishishTa-ajnAna can be sAkshi-bhAsya. The example is as under: though only-paramANu is not amenable to mAnasa-pratyaksha, as an adjective to jnAna in the form of “I do not know paramANu”, it is the vishaya of mAnasa-pratyaksha. Further, only Rahu is not a vishaya of pratyaksha, but qualified by

moon, it is the vishaya of pratyaksha. Tattva-DIpana, p. 52 says - केवलस्य (अज्ञानस्य) साक्षिवेद्यत्व-अभावे अपि विशिष्टस्य (अज्ञानस्य) साक्षिवेद्यत्वात् अज्ञान-स्फोरकत्वं सिद्धम्। न च - केवलस्य साक्षिवेद्यत्व-अभावे विशिष्टस्य-अपि न साक्षिवेद्यत्वम् इति - वाच्यम्; केवल-परमाणोः मानस-प्रत्यक्ष-अभावे अपि “परमाणुमहं न जानामि” इति ज्ञान-विशेषण-तया प्रत्यक्ष-विषयत्व-उपगमात् इत्यर्थः।

VPS p.56 elaborates the same issue in another dimension and explains as under:

Objection: “I do not know the pot”, here ajnAna-vyAvartaka-vishaya is pot. However, this pot has no connection with sAkshI. And hence, it cannot be perceived by sAkshI. Because, the perception-of-pot is dependent on pramANa. Further, pot, in the instant case, cannot be perceived by pramANa either, because pramANa being present, the ignorance of pot can no longer appear. Hence, “I do not know pot” cannot be present if pramANa for pot is present. Thus, pot-without-a-sambandha-with-sAkshI cannot be perceived by sAkshI. And hence, pot-vishishTa-ajnAna cannot be illuminated by sAkshI either. (ननु अहं घटं न जानामि इत्यत्र अज्ञान-व्यावर्तको घटो न तावत् सम्बन्ध-रहितेन साक्षिणा प्रत्येतुं योग्यः, बाह्यविषय[प्रतिभासा]सिद्धेः स्व-संबद्ध-प्रमाण-आयत्त-त्वात्। न अपि प्रमाणेन; प्रमाण-निवर्त्यत्वात्-अज्ञानस्य इति चेत्)

Answer: It is correct to hold that only pot cannot be perceived by sAkshI. However, there is nothing incongruous in accepting that pot qualified with ajnAtatva-dharma i.e. ajnAtatva-vishishTa-pot can be sAkshi-bhAsya on the analogy of paramANu and Rahu. This is so because ajnAtatva-vishishTa-pot gets a sambandha with sAkshI through ajnAna

and hence can become sAkshi-bhAsya. केवलस्य-घटस्य साक्षिवेद्यत्व-अभावे-अपि अज्ञातत्व-धर्म-विशिष्टस्य (घटस्य) अज्ञान-द्वारा सम्बन्धवता-साक्षिणा प्रतीतिः उपपद्यते एव।

Objection: Well, if pot can be known by sAkshI by being qualified with ajnAtatva-dharma, then what exactly is the role of pramANa? It becomes useless then!

Answer: Well, just as ajnAna brings in ajnAtatva-dharma in its vishaya-pot and thereby ensures connection with sAkshI, similarly, pramANa brings in jnAtatva-dharma in its vishaya-pot and thereby ensures connection with sAkshI.

Thus, only-pot is not sAkshi-bhAsya, but ajnAtatva-vishishTa-pot (caused by ajnAna) and jnAtatva-vishishTa-pot (caused by pramANa) are sAkshi-bhAsya. Here, VivaraNa makes a path-breaking statement in p.52 - सर्वं वस्तु ज्ञाततया वा अज्ञाततया वा साक्षिचैतन्यस्य विषय एव।

Now, jnAtatayA-sAkshi-vedyatva requires the intervention of pramANa. तत्र ज्ञाततया विषयः प्रमाणव्यवधानमपेक्षते। However, ajnAtatayA-sAkshi-vedyatva does not require intervention of pramANa. It is beginningless. And it is always illuminated. Whether in sAmAnyA-AkAra or vishesha-AkAra, all vishaya are always sAkshi-bhAsya. अन्यस्तु (अज्ञाततया विषयः तु) सामान्याकारेण विशेषाकारेण वा अज्ञानव्यावर्तकतया सदा भासते।

Reference from BrihadAraNyaka BhAshya VArtika sAra

It is important to understand that even a completely unknown object is also always illuminated by sAkshI. Even when I do not know that I do not know x, still, it is being illuminated by sAkshI as unknown. This becomes evident when someone asks me as to whether I know x. So, prior thereto, x was being illuminated by sAkshI as sAmAnyA-AkAreNa-ajnAna-vyAvartakatayA whereas after becoming aware of my ignorance of x, it shines vishesha-AkAreNa-ajnAna-vyAvartakatayA. Here, some important shLOkAs from prameya-parIkshA of BrihadAraNyak BhAshya VArtika sAra are pertinent.

अविज्ञातः प्रमाणानां विषयो वादिनां मतः । सोऽज्ञातोऽर्थः प्रमाणात् किं सियेद्यद्वाऽनुभूतितः ॥ २ ॥

न तावन्मानतः सिद्धिर्मानेन तदपेक्षणात् । नाज्ञातमनुद्दिश्य क्वचिन्मानं प्रवर्तते ॥ ३ ॥

The vishaya of pramANa is always unknown. Through pramANa, we come to know an unknown object. Therefore, it is accepted by everyone that ajnAta-artha is the vishaya of pramANa. The question is -- how exactly is ajnAta-artha established as ajnAta-artha! Is it by pramANa or is it by anubhUti (sAkshI).

Certainly, ajnAta-artha cannot be established by pramANa, as it is required by pramANa beforehand. And the very operation of pramANa requires prior existence of ajnAta-artha. So, pramANa can never establish ajnAta-artha.

मानसिद्धं समुद्दिश्य यदि मानं प्रवर्तते । आत्माश्रयादिदोषः स्यान्नैष्फल्यं च मितेस्तथा ॥ ४ ॥

If one says that ajnAta-artha is not the vishaya of pramANa but pramANa-siddha-artha is the vishaya of pramANa, then obviously there would arise AtmAshraya-dOsha and also the uselessness of pramANa.

अज्ञातत्वं मेयगतं मानेनाऽतो निवर्त्यते । नाऽज्ञातत्वमतो मानात्सिद्ध्यतीति विनिश्चयः ॥ १० ॥

अज्ञातत्वमिदं मानादसिद्धं केन सिद्ध्यति । इति चेत्, नित्यचैतन्यानुभवेनाऽनुभूयते ॥ ११ ॥

The conclusion here is this - ajnAtatva belongs to the object, artha. That ajnAtatva is not established by pramANa. Rather, it is removed by pramANa. This ajnAtatva is established/experienced by nitya-chaitanya i.e. sAkshI.

नाऽज्ञासिषमिदं पूर्वमित्येवं प्रमिते पटे । पूर्वाज्ञातत्वविषयः परामर्शो ह्यतिस्फुटः ॥ १२ ॥

न तस्याऽननुभूतस्य परामर्शः कथञ्चन । अनुभूतिर्न प्रमाणाच्चैतन्यं तेन शिष्यते ॥ १३ ॥

If we analyse our experience, then we see that after knowing a hitherto unknown pot, we say - this very pot was so far unknown to me. Thus, we demonstrate the recollection of our earlier experienced ajnAtatva of this very pot. Now, recollection is not possible of something which has not been experienced earlier. Hence, it is clear that nitya-sAkshi-chaitanya alone illuminates the ajnAta-artha.

प्रवृत्तं विषये मानं बोधयेद्विषयाकृतिम् । ज्ञातताज्ञातते भातो न तेनाविषयत्वतः ॥ १४ ॥

pramANa for a particular vishaya illumines merely the vishaya-AkAra. jnAtatva and ajnAtatva, belonging to vishaya, are not known by pramANa, because they are not the vishaya of pramANa. They are illuminated/known by sAkshI.

घटोऽपि तर्हि गृह्येत चितैव ज्ञाततादिवत् । इति चेदिष्टमेवैतद् गृह्येत च घटश्चिता ॥ १७ ॥

ज्ञातत्वेन घटो भाति सोऽज्ञातत्वेन भासते । इत्युक्ते घट एवाऽत्र चिता द्वेधाऽवभास्यते ॥ १८ ॥

न चैवं मानवैयर्थ्यं ज्ञातुत्वायोपयोगतः । अज्ञातत्वायोपयुक्तं तत्राऽज्ञानं यथा तथा ॥ १९ ॥

Objection: Sir. If jnAtatva and ajnAtatva are known by sAkshI, then let even the pot be illuminated by sAkshI.

Answer: Well. That is desirable. Just as the pot appears qualified with jnAtatva, similarly it appears qualified with ajnAtatva. Pot appears in two manners, qualified by jnAtatva and qualified by ajnAtatva, by sAkshi-chaitanya only. And, please! Don't argue about the utility of pramANa. The role of pramANa is to bring about jnAtatva just as ajnAna is required to bring about ajnAtatva in the pot.

मानाज्ञानविहीनस्य कालस्याऽसत्त्वतो घटः । ज्ञाताज्ञातत्वनिर्मुक्तः केवलो भाति न क्वचित् ॥ २० ॥

सर्वथापि चिता भास्यमज्ञातत्वं घटादिषु । प्रमाणनैरपेक्ष्येण तत्सिद्धेः सर्वसम्मतः ॥ २१ ॥

स्वतोऽनुभवतः सिद्धां बालोऽप्यज्ञाततां हठात् । न किञ्चिज्ज्ञातमित्येवं वक्ति पृष्ठः प्रमां विना ॥ २२ ॥

अथाऽनुभूतपूर्वत्वाद् घटादौ शङ्कते प्रमा । अत्यन्ताननुभूतोऽर्थ उदाहार्यस्तथा सति ॥ २३ ॥

There just exists no such time when only-pot shines without jnAtatva or ajnAtatva. This is because there exists no such time when either pramANa or ajnAna is not operating. In every manner, the ajnAtatva in pot etc is illuminated by sAkshI. That is independent of pramANa. Further, this ajnAtatva is not born. It is beginningless. Even a child knows his ajnAtatva by his own anubhava. Without any pramA, he confirms his ajnAtatva.

Well, one can have some confusion about the knower of ajnAtatva, in the case of a pot which was earlier known by pramANa and is now unknown. But in case of an atyanta-ananubhUta-vastu, there is just no room for confusion.

अत्यन्ताननुभूतेषु हिमवत्पृष्ठवस्तुषु । अज्ञातत्वमशङ्कः सन् परामृशति मानवः ॥ २४ ॥

न चात्राऽनुभवो लुप्तो न जानामीति तत्स्मृतेः । अदृष्टमपि तद् दृष्ट्वा स्मरेन्नाऽज्ञासिषं त्विति ॥ २५ ॥

In case of atyanta-ananubhUta-vastu, absolutely-non-experienced-object such as objects atop some mountain, one doubtlessly and confidently recalls his ajnAtatva. Since one has clear recollection in the form of “I don’t know and I have not been knowing it so far”, there is no absence of anubhava.

अथेन्द्रियाणां सत्त्वेन कथञ्चिच्छक्यते प्रमा । तर्हि लुप्तेन्द्रियावस्था स्यात्सुषुप्तिरुदाहृतिः ॥ २६ ॥

निःशेषकरणग्रामलयेऽप्यनुभवः स्वतः । अलुप्तदृक् सुषुप्तेऽस्ति जाग्रद्विधाविशेषतः ॥ २७ ॥

If on account of existence of senses, in some manner one avers the possibility of pramANa for knowing ajnAtatva, then that stands negated on account of similar anubhava in case of

sushupti when senses are merged (in ignorance). Despite the merger of entirety of senses, the ceaseless-seer, the sAkshi-chaitanya, experiences in sushupti. And this experience of ajnAtatva in jAgrat is non-different from that of sushupti.

The sum and substance of vArtika-sAra is this:

pramANa makes an unknown-object known. It does not ensure knowing of unknown-object as unknown. Nor does it ensure knowing the known-object as known. These two functions are carried out by sAkshI. Thus, ajnAta-artha-siddhi is by sAkshI and not by pramAtA. Only-object is never known by sAkshI. But is known by sAkshI as either qualified with ajNAtatva or jnAtatva. The role of pramANa is to bring about jnAtatva in place of ajnAtatva. This ajnAtatva is beginningless and is illuminated always by the sAkshI, even when one is ignorant of the very ignorance of the object, such as in the case of atyanta-ananubhUta-vastu. That is evident from the recollection of past ignorance. Such anubhava is not at all different from that in sushupti. Also, ajnAna is never experienced without the vyAvartaka-vishaya. Thus, it is clear that “अहम् अज्ञः” has bhAvarUpa-ajnAna as the vishaya.

Objection: But how can the ajnAna, which is like darkness, situate in shuddha chaitanya, which is prakAsha-swarUpa?

Answer: First and foremost, darkness is not contradictory to prakAsha but only to prakhara-prakAsha. Similarly, ajnAna is not contradictory to shuddha-chaitanya but only to pramANa-vritti-pratibimbata-chaitanya. Hence, the objection is not justified.

Also, even if we accept for the time being that light and darkness are contradictory, yet there is a difference between the contradiction of ajnAna vis-a-vis jnAna and that of darkness vis-a-vis light. In the case of ajnAna-vs-jnAna, ajnAna is seen to be present in something which is known. Therefore, neither shuddha chaitanya nor sAkshI is contradictory to ajnAna.

Objection: To posit ajnAna of something which shines is contradictory to experience. Something which shines before you cannot be covered by ajnAna as something which is covered by ajnAna can never shine.

Answer: Not so. This question – how can there be ajnAna in something which is shining – is contradictory to anubhava. As we have seen earlier, ajnAna has shuddha-chaitanya as the vishaya. However, in ajnAna of specific vastu say ghaTa, the ghaTa-ajnAna is basically ajnAna of ghaTa-avachchinna-chaitanya. Here, ghaTa acts as a vyAvartaka or avachchedaka of shuddha-chaitanya. However, since both ajnAna and ghaTa have adhyAsa with shuddha chaitanya, ghaTa appears as vyAvartaka i.e. avachchedaka i.e. adjective of ajnAna. And we state – ghaTa is not known. In reality, it is the ghaTa-avachchinna-chaitanya which is not known.

Now, we have seen earlier that pramANa is ajnAta-jnApakam. It makes an unknown object known. It never makes a known object known. Thus, unknown-object and known-object are known not by pramANa but by sAkshI. Thus, unknown-object is known by sAkshI अज्ञाततया whereas known-object is known by sAkshI ज्ञाततया. We have discussed that VivaraNa says – अत एव सर्वं वस्तु ज्ञाततयाज्ञाततया च साक्षिचैतन्यस्य विषय. If an object is not revealed by sAkshI, one cannot have the ajnAna thereof either. The ajnAna-qualified-by-ghaTa cannot be illuminated by sAkshI unless ghaTa is also illuminated by sAkshI. It should be noted that jnAtatva and ajnAtatva both are the dharma of ghaTa-avchchhinna-chaitanya. However, on account of adhyAsa of ghaTa with ghaTa-avachchhinna-chaitanya, they appear to belong to ghaTa. Thus, ajnAna-avachchhedaka-vishaya is also illuminated by sAkshI and hence vishaya-Avaraka-ajnAna is not removed by sAkshI-jnAna (it is removed only by pramANa-jnAna). Basically, since ajnAna-qualified-by-the-vishaya is sAkshi-bhAsya, the qualifier-vishaya has to be sAkshi-bhAsya. It is to be noted that ajnAna is never known without being qualified by the adjective thereof.

Objection: But this pratIti of “अहम् अज्ञः” has ahamartha i.e. ahamkAra as the Ashraya. However, ahamkAra is ajnAna-kArya and hence cannot be the Ashraya of ajnAna. Therefore, ajnAna cannot be the vishaya of pratIti “अहम् अज्ञः”. The only option left is to accept that jnAna-abhAva is the vishaya of this pratIti.

Answer: Not so. Chaitanya is the Ashraya of ajnAna. And in that very chaitanya, where ajnAna is adhyasta, ahamartha also has tAdAtmya-adhyAsa with ajnAna as the avachchhedaka. On account of this tAdAtmya-adhyAsa, there is eka-Ashrayatva-sambandha. Thus, due to sAmAnAdhikaraNaya of ahamartha and ajnAna in chaitanya, ajnAna appears as connected to ahamartha. It should not be confused that ajnAna has ahamartha as the Ashraya.

Thus, there is no incongruity in ajnAna being the vishaya of “अहम् अज्ञः”, because ahamartha is not the Ashraya of ajnAna. BALabOdhinI, p. 1118, says - यस्मिन्नेव चैतन्ये अज्ञानम्-अध्यस्तम्, अज्ञान-अवच्छेदेन तस्मिन्-एव चैतन्ये अहमर्थो-अपि अध्यस्तः। तथा च सामानाधिकरण्य-संबन्धेन अज्ञानम्-अहमर्थ-सम्बन्धितया भासते, न तु अज्ञानम्-अहमर्थ-आश्रितम्...उक्तञ्च विवरणे - एवम् अज्ञान-अन्तःकरण-योः एकात्म-सम्बन्धात् अहमज्ञ इति अवभासः न अन्तःकरणस्य-अज्ञान-सम्बन्धात् इति।

Objection: In your siddhAnta, the AvaraNa by ajnAna is on shuddha chaitanya only. There is no AvaraNa or AvaraNa-kriyA with respect to anAtmA. Therefore, pot can never be vishaya-of-ajnAna. However, we do have pratIti in the form of “घटं न जानामि”. Since it is accepted by you that pot is not ajnAna-vishaya, it naturally follows that “घटं न जानामि” can have only ghaTa-jnAna-abhAva as the vishaya. And if you accept “घटं न जानामि” to have ghaTa-jnAna-abhAva as the vishaya, then what fault has “अहम् अज्ञः” done. Let that also be jnAna-abhAva-vishayaka. सिद्धान्ते जडे आवरण-अभावात् घटं न जानामि-इत्यादि-प्रतीतिः घट-विषयक-ज्ञानाभाव-विषयिणी-एव वक्तव्या, न घट-विषयक-अज्ञान-विषयिणी। एवञ्च घटं न जानामीति

प्रतीतिः घट-विषयक-ज्ञानाभाव-विषयिणी-एव सिद्धान्तिना यदि अङ्गीकरणीया, तदा अहमज्ञ इति प्रतीतिरपि ज्ञानाभाव-विषयिणी-एव अस्तु को दोषः? (BALabOdhinI, p.1119)

Answer: Not so. In the pratIti “घटं न जानामि”, it is the ghaTa-avachchhinna-chaitanya which has the AvaraNa. Therefore, it is the ghaTa-avachchhinna-chaitanya, which is not manifest. When pramANa-vritti is not present, then chaitanya is covered by ajnAna with ghaTa as the avachchhedaka. That Avaraka-ajnAna is illuminated by sAkshI. Thus, in the pratIti “घटं न जानामि”, ghaTa-avachchhinna-chaitanya-Avaraka-ajnAna is illuminated by sAkshI. And hence, there can be no extension of logic adduced in the objection to the pratIti “अहम् अज्ञः”.

Objection: Fine. But in case of sAkshi-bhAsya objects such as sukha, dukha or prAtibhAsika-vastu such as shukti-rUpya, there is no ajnAna. How do you then explain the pratIti “न जानामि” in such cases?

Answer: Well, in the case of sAkshi-vedya-vastu, this pratIti “न जानामि” itself is not accepted. Sukha-dukha which belong to oneself or the shuktirUpya etc are never unknown when they are present. BALabOdhinI, p. 1120, says - स्व-गत-सुख-दुःखादीनां विद्यमानता-दशायां न जानामि-इति व्यवहारः अप्रसिद्ध एव। एवमेव यस्य पुरुषस्य शुक्तौ रजतभ्रान्तिः, तस्मिन्नेव भ्रान्तिसमये शुक्तिरजतं न जानामि इति व्यवहारः अप्रसिद्ध एव।

In case of sukha-dukha belonging to other-person and not to oneself, then yes, there can be ajnAna thereof. However, that ajnAna is asattva-ApAdaka-ajnAna located in pramAtA.

This is pramAtri-chaitanya-Ashrita and NOT vishaya-avachchhinna-chaitanya-Ashrita. This pramAtrit-chaitanya-Ashrita-asattva-ApAdaka-ajnAna is removable by either of the parOksha-pramA or aparOksha-pramA. “न जानामि” transaction takes place on account of asattva-ApAdaka-ajnAna, whereas vishaya-avachchhinna-chaitanya-Ashrita-ajnAna i.e. abhAna-ApAdaka-ajnAna leads to transaction “न भाति”. Thus, in case of sukha-dukha-belonging-to-other-person, the vyavahAra “न जानामि” is explained by asattva-ApAdaka-ajnAna when parOksha-jnAna is not present. When there is parOksha-jnAna in the form of anumiti etc, then such vyavahAra does not take place. Thus, there is no incongruity. BALabOdhinI, p. 1120, says - यदा पर-पुरुषस्य पर-पुरुषीय-सुख-दुखादि-विषयक-अनुमिति-आदि-रूपं परोक्ष-ज्ञानं न-उत्पन्नं तदा प्रमातृगत-अज्ञान-अनिवृत्त्या “न जानामि” इति व्यवहारः स्यात्। अनुमिति-आदि-रूपं परोक्ष-ज्ञान-उदये तु पर-पुरुषीय-सुख-दुखं जानामि इति एव व्यवहारः।

The analysis of “अहम् अज्ञः” vis-a-vis “मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति”

Objection: When we say “भूतले घटो नास्ति”, here pot-abhAva is the visheshya and bhUtala is the visheshaNā. In the case of “अघटं भूतलम्”, bhUtala is the visheshya and ghaTa-abhAva is the visheshaNā. Apart from this reversal of visheshya-visheshaNā-bhAva, as far as the vishaya is concerned, there is no difference. Both these pratIti are accepted to be pot-abhAva-vishayaka. Similarly, in case of “मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति”, everyone accepts it to have jnAna-abhAva (pot-abhAva) as visheshya and ahamartha (bhUtala) as visheshaNā. Therefore, on the analogy

presented, अहम् अज्ञः, should have jnAna-abhAva as visheshaNa and ahamartha as visheshya. Thus, both these pratIti namely अहम् अज्ञः and मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति have jnAna-abhAva as the vishaya. Hence, your claim of अहम् अज्ञः having bhAvarUpa-ajnAna as the vishaya is incorrect.

Answer: While it is true that both अहम् अज्ञः and मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति have identical vishaya, it is incorrect to hold that that vishaya is jnAna-abhAva. Both these pratIti are, in fact, having bhAvarUpa-ajnAna as vishaya. This is because of the reason adduced earlier. There can be no abhAva-jnAna in the absence of dharmI-jnAna and pratiyOgI-jnAna. Now, if jnAna-abhAva were to be the vishaya, then in order to know it, one needs to know dharmI and pratiyOgI. And they being already known, how can jnAna-abhAva be present! It is a contradiction to say that jnAna-abhAva is present along with dharmI-jnAna and pratiyOgI-jnAna. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1121, says - धर्मिप्रतियोगिज्ञानाज्ञानाभ्यां ज्ञानसामान्याभावज्ञानस्य व्याहतत्वेन 'मयि ज्ञानं नास्ती'त्यस्यापि भावरूपाज्ञानविषयत्वेन विषयभेदाप्रतीतेर्युक्तत्वात् । Thus, both these pratIti have bhAvarUpa-ajnAna as vishaya.

Further, for the following reason also, “मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति” needs to be bhAvarUpa-ajnAna-vishayaka and not jnAna-abhAva-vishayaka. This pratIti “मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति” is like the pratIti “वायौ रूपं नास्ति”. Now, “वायौ रूपं नास्ति” appears as sAmAnyA-abhAva and not as vishesha-abhAva. Therefore, it can be only either of the following two.

1. rUpatva-avachchhinna-pratiyOgitAka-yAvat-rUpa-vishesha-abhAva-kUTa,
wherein rUpatva-avachchhinna-pratiyOgitAkatva resides in all vishesha-abhAva through
vyAsajya-vritti. OR
2. rUpatva-avachchhinna-pratiyOgitAka-yAvat-rUpa-vishesha-abhAva-kUTa-anya-s
AmAny-a-abhAva.

Other than these two, there is no third option possible. One cannot argue that yat-kinchid-vishesha-abhAva is sAmAny-a-dharma-avachchhinna-pratiyOgitAka-abhAva. Because in that case, even when there is a pot on ground, there would arise the contingency of the pratIti “निर्घटं भूतलम्”. (यत्किंचिद्विशेषाभावस्य सामान्यावच्छिन्नप्रतियोगिताकत्वे घटवत्यपि भूतले ‘निर्घटं भूतलमि’ति प्रतीतेः आपत्तिः। In sAmAny-a-abhAva, the pratiyOgitA-avachchhedaka is sAmAny-a-dharma, whereas in vishesha-abhAva, the pratiyOgitA-avachchhedaka cannot be sAmAny-a-dharma. Otherwise, these two abhAvAs cannot be distinguished. BAlabOdhinI, p. 1159, says - सामान्यधर्मावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताकत्वेनैव सामान्याभावो विशेषाभावेभ्यो भिद्यते। विशेषाभावोऽपि यदि सामान्यधर्मावच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताकः स्यात्तर्हि सामान्याभावो न सिध्येत्, सामान्यधर्मावच्छिन्न प्रतियोगिताकाभाव एव सामान्याभावः।

Now, in either of the two cases, it is obvious that to know jnAna-abhAva, there would remain the requirement of knowing dharmI-jnAna and pratiyOgI-jnAna. And hence, the contradiction would remain. Hence, it is clear that “मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति” cannot have jnAna-abhAva as the vishaya. BAlabOdhinI, p. 1123, says - अभाव-प्रत्यक्ष-कारणीभूतयोः धर्मि-प्रतियोगि-ज्ञानयोः सत्त्वे सामान्य-अभावो न स्थातुमर्हति।

Thus, it is erroneous to compare “भूतले घटो नास्ति” with “मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति”. While there is no possibility of self-contradiction in the case of the former, there is a certain contradiction in the case of the latter. BALabOdhinI, p. 1128, says - घट-सामान्याभाव-पट-सामान्याभावादि-प्रतीतेः ज्ञानसामान्याभाव-प्रतीतौ वैलक्षण्यम्-अवश्यम्-अङ्गीकरणीयम्। घटादि-सामान्य-अभाव-प्रत्यक्षे न कापि व्याघातदोषसंभावना। किन्तु ज्ञान-सामान्य-अभाव-प्रत्यक्ष-प्रतीतिः न केनापि रूपेण सम्भाव्यते।

Now, if there is pratIti-vailakshaNya, then vishaya-valakshaNya needs to be admitted as there is lAghava therein. Therefore, “मयि ज्ञानं नास्ति” does not have jnAna-abhAva as the vishaya, rather bhAvarUpa-ajnAna itself is the vishaya of this pratIti.

Objection: Let jnAna-vishesha-abhAva be the vishaya of “न जानामि”. Then the stated defects would not arise!

Answer: Well, in that case, even when you have x-jnAna, you would certainly have y-jnAna-abhAva. No one can have all jnAna. Then, even when one has x-jnAna, there would arise the contingency of the pratIti “न जानामि” and one would start making effort to know even that which is already known. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1126, says - तद्यदि ज्ञानविशेषाभावो 'न जानामी'ति प्रतीतेर्विषयः, तदा ज्ञातेऽपि तथा प्रतीत्यापातः; तद्विचारार्थं च प्रवृत्तिः स्यात् ।

Objection: Fine! Let that be so. However, even in your case of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna, there is the pratIti of ajnAna as jnAna-virOdhi only. VivaraNa says also - अज्ञानमिति च द्वयसापेक्ष-ज्ञानपर्युदासेन-अभिधानात्-द्वयसापेक्षवत्-अवभासते। If this is not accepted, then the ajnAna-virOdhitva of jnAna would not be acceptable. And if that is so, then on

account of the presence of virOdha-nirUpaka-jnAna and ajnAna, there is contradiction in your case as well. Therefore, contradiction is identical in your case as well in my case. So, let the pratIti remain of jnAna-abhAva only.

Answer: The meaning of VivaraNa sentence is as under. jnAna is always Ashraya-vishaya-sApeksha. आश्रय-विषय-सापेक्षं ज्ञानं प्रतीयते - अस्य (विषय) अस्मिन् (आश्रय) ज्ञानमिति।

Now, ajnAna appears as virOdhi of this jnAna-which-appears-related-to-Ashraya-and-vishaya. Now, ajnAna has a virOdha within it. The nirUpaka of that virOdha is jnAna. If that virOdha-nirUpaka-jnAna is not known, then there cannot be the pratIti of ajnAna. And, if the virOdha-nirUpaka-jnAna is already known, then where is the room for ajnAna. The ajnAna cannot remain. BAlabOdhinI, p. 1131, says - अतो ज्ञान-विरोधित्व-रूपेण प्रतीयमाने-अज्ञाने यो ज्ञान-विरोधः तस्य निरूपकं ज्ञानं (a) यदि ज्ञातं न स्यात्, तर्हि ज्ञान-विरोधि अज्ञानम्-इति प्रतीतिः अपि न स्यात् (b) यदि ज्ञातं स्यात्, तर्हि अज्ञानम्-एव न स्यात्, (अतः) तदा अपि ज्ञानविरोधित्वेन अज्ञानं न प्रतीयेत। So, let us take for example “अहं ब्रह्म न जानामि”. The vishaya of this pratIti is ajnAna. It has virOdha with Brahma-jnAna. That Brahma-jnAna is pramA-rUpa. Now, if Brahma-jnAna is not known, then on account of not knowing the nirUpaka, the nirUpita-ajnAna cannot be known either. And if Brahma-jnAna is known, then also ajnAna cannot appear. So, the contradiction is there in case of siddhAntI.

Similarly, pUrvapakshI also has the following in mind - ajnAna pratIti is never without its vishaya. Only ajnAna is never perceived. It is only vishaya-visheshita-ajnAna which is

perceived. Now, if the vishaya of ajnAna is not known, then ajnAna cannot be known. And if the vishaya is known, then also ajnAna cannot remain and hence not be perceived. Thus, siddhAntI too has the contradiction. BAlabOdhinI, p. 1131, says - निर्विषयक-अज्ञानस्य प्रतीतिः एव न भवति। अतो विषय-विशेषित-अज्ञानस्य-एव प्रतीतिः अङ्गीकरणीया। अज्ञान-व्यावर्तको-विषयो यदि ज्ञातो न स्यात्, तदा विषय-विशेषित-अज्ञान-प्रतीतिः एव न स्यात्। यदि अज्ञान-व्यावर्तको-विषयो ज्ञातः स्यात् तदा अज्ञानमेव न तिष्ठेत्। अतो अज्ञान-व्यावर्तक-विषयस्य ज्ञाने अज्ञाने वा उभयथा अज्ञान प्रतीतिः व्याहता.

These are the twin arguments of the opponent, one - on account of virOdha-nirUpaka-jnAna, and second - on account of only-ajnAna not being perceived. These objections have already been responded to in VivaraNa by stating that सर्वं वस्तु ज्ञाततया वा अज्ञाततया वा साक्षिचैतन्यस्य विषय एव। तत्र ज्ञाततया विषयः प्रमाणव्यवधानमपेक्षते, अन्यस्तु सामान्याकारेण विशेषाकारेण वा अज्ञानव्यावर्तकतया सदा भासते इति उपपत्तिसहितं अज्ञानप्रत्यक्षं भावरूपमेव आत्मनि अज्ञानं गमयति इति सिद्धम्। The basic idea is this - ajnAna-nishTha-virOdha-nirUpaka-jnAna and vishaya-of-ajnAna are both sAkshi-vedya and not pramAtri-gamya. Further, sAkshI is ajnAna-sAdhaka and not ajnAa-nivartaka. Had there been an expectation of pramA-jnAna of virOdha-nirUpaka-jnAna or vishaya-of-ajnAna, then there would have been a contradiction. But, since sAksh-jnAna is enough to ensure the pratIti, there is no contradiction. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1132, says - प्रमाणवृत्तिनिवर्त्यस्यापि भावरूपाज्ञानस्य साक्षिवेद्यस्य विरोधिनिरूपकज्ञान-तद्व्यावर्तकविषयग्राहकेण साक्षिणा तत्साधकेन तदनाशाद्व्याहृत्यनुपपत्तेः । अज्ञानग्रहे विषयगोचर-प्रमापेक्षायां व्याहतिः स्यादेव, सा च नास्ति । तदुक्तं विवरणे-“सर्वं वस्तु ज्ञाततयाऽज्ञाततया वा साक्षिचैतन्यस्य विषय एवे”ति ।

Thus, ajnAna-vyAvartaka-vishaya is established by sAkshI ajnAatatayA, whereas pramA-vyAvartaka-vishaya is established by sAkshI jnAatatayA. BALabOdhinI, p. 1132, says - अज्ञान-व्यावर्तको-विषयः साक्षि-चैतन्येन अज्ञाततया सिध्यति, प्रमा-व्यावर्तको-विषयः साक्षि-चैतन्येन ज्ञाततया सिध्यति।

Inadmissibility of jnAna-abhAva as sAkshi-vedya

Objection: Well, in that case, let jnAna-abhAva be sAkshi-vedya. Let the dharmI-jnAna, pratiyOgi-jnAna be sAkshi-vedya. And thus, “न जानामि” can have pramANa-vritti-abhAva as its vishaya. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1132, says - ज्ञानाभावपक्षेऽपि विषयादिज्ञानं साक्षिरूपम् , 'न जानामी'ति धीस्तु प्रमाणवृत्त्यभावविषयेति न व्याहतिरिति. We say this because jnAna is sAkshi-vedya in our view also. And hence, jnAna-abhAva should also be sAkshi-vedya. There is a rule that pratiyOgI and pratiyOgI-abhAva are known by the same pramANa. BALabOdhinI, p. 1133, says - प्रतियोगी येन प्रमाणेन विद्यते, तदभावो अपि तेनैव प्रमाणेन विद्यते।

Answer: This is not possible. Because, abhAva is vishaya of anupalabdhi-pramANa and parOksha-vishaya, whereas the impugned pratIti is aparOksha. abhAva not being present, there cannot be tAdAtmya with anAvrit-sAkshI, and hence there can never be sAkshi-vedyatA of abhAva. BALabOdhinI, p. 1134, says - अविद्यमानेन ज्ञानाभावेन सह-अनावृत-साक्षिणः-तादात्म्य-असम्भवात् ज्ञानाभावस्य साक्षिवेद्यता नैव संभवति। अविद्यमानं वस्तु अनावृत-साक्षिणा सह तादात्म्य-आपन्नं न भवति। However, the situation is not so in case of ajnAna. Since ajnAna is

sAkshi-vedya, its vishaya or pramA, even if not present, can be sAkshi-vedya on account of being the visheshaNa of ajnAna. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1135, says - अज्ञानविशेषणतया तु अनुत्पन्नमपि ज्ञानं साक्षिवेद्यमिति न दोषसाम्यम् ।

Further, there are following differences between jnAna-abhAva and ajnAna:

- ajnAna is both bhAva-vilakshaNa and abhAva-vilakshaNa. jnAna-abhAva is only bhAva-vilakshaNa but not abhAva-vilakshaNa. jnAna-abhAva is an abhAva.
- ajnAna is sAkshi-bhAsya. But jnAna-abhAva is pramAtri-gamya. jnAna-abhAva is known through vyatirekI-anumAna or arthApatti or anupalabdhi. [BAlabOdhinI,p. 1134, holds that jnAna-abhAva cannot be known by anupalabdhi - ज्ञान-भिन्न-प्रतियोगिक-अभावस्य षष्ठ-प्रमाण-वेद्यत्व-सम्भवे अपि ज्ञान-अभावस्य षष्ठ-प्रमाण-वेद्यता अपि न सम्भवति।] However, vyAtirekI-anumAna/arthApatti is undoubtedly pramANa in jnAna-abhAva.
- ajnAna is known in sushupti by sAkshI (ajnAtatayA). The jnAna-abhAva of sushupti is not known through anupalabdhi. The jnAna-abhAva of sushupti is known by waker through vyatirekI-anumAna or arthApatti. [एवमुत्थितस्य ज्ञानाभावपरामर्शोऽपि। ज्ञानविरोधिनाऽज्ञानस्यानुभूततया स्मर्यमाणस्यानुपपत्त्यैव प्रमीयते नानुस्मर्यते॥ - VivaraNa]
- The vyatirekI-anumAna is as under: यत्र यत्र अज्ञानं, तत्र तत्र ज्ञानाभावः, यन्नैवं तन्नैवम्, यथा घटज्ञानवति (घटज्ञानाभावाभाववति) मयि घटाज्ञानं नास्ति (घटाज्ञान-अभावः अस्ति). Here, the hetu/vyApya is ajnAna and sAdhya/vyApaka is jnAna-abhAva. The anumAna works by showing vyApti between sAdhya-abhAva and hetu-abhAva. [पूर्वकालेऽहं, गजज्ञानाभाववान्, गजाज्ञानवत्त्वात्, यन्नैवं

तन्नैवम् , यथा गजज्ञानवानहमिति, एवं सर्वत्राज्ञानस्य ज्ञानाभावव्याप्यत्वेन तदनुमापकत्वम् । - Advaita Siddhi]

This can also be simplified further by taking ajnAna as hetu and upalabdhi-abhAva as sAdhya. And from inferred upalabdhi-abhAva, one can arrive at upalabhya-abhAva through anupalabdhi-pramANa. [This is demonstrated in mechanics of jnAna-abhAva at the end of this write-up].

- While (aparoksha-jnAna)-abhAva can be known through aforesaid means, (paroksha-jnAna)-abhAva is known through an anumAna wherein paroksha-jnAna-sAmagrI-viraha is hetu. The aforesaid vyatirekI-anumAna does not apply in case of (paroksha-jnAna)-abhAva.

- jnAna-abhAva is an atyanta-abhAva. It is precisely depicted as ज्ञानत्व-रूप-सामान्य-धर्म-अवच्छिन्न-प्रतियोगिताक-यावत्-विशेषज्ञान-अत्यन्त-अभावकूट.

- ajnAna is capable of causing AvaraNa of Brahman on account of being abhAva-vilakshaNa. jnAna-abhAva is not capable of causing AvaraNa of Brahman being an abhAva.

- aparoksha-jnAna removes ajnAna and consequently ensures removal of (aparoksha-jnAna)-abhAva. aparoksha-jnAna, however, does not automatically result in (paroksha-jnAna)-abhAva. (paroksha-jnAna)-abhAva is inferred from anumAna whose hetu is paroksha-jnAna-sAmagrI-viraha. [अथापरोक्षतो ज्ञातेऽज्ञानाभावात् कथं परोक्षज्ञानाभावानुमानम् ?

सामग्रीविरहादिनेति गृहाण । - Advaita Siddhi]

- When ajnAna is stated by BhAshyakAra as jnAna-abhAva, viparIta-jnAna and samshaya-jnAna, the aforesaid distinctions of ajnAna and jnAna-abhAva should be kept in mind. Here, ajnAna refers to that which causes AvaraNa. jnAna-abhAva, viparIta-jnAna and samshaya-jnAna cannot cause AvaraNa.[तस्मात् सुषुप्तादौ स्वरूपानवभासव्यवहारः अग्रहणमिथ्याज्ञानतत्संस्कारकर्मभ्यः अन्यदेव किञ्चित् प्रतिबन्धकं अज्ञानं कल्पयतीत्यर्थः - VivaraNa]
- ajnAna is an aparoksha-vishaya. jnAna-abhAva is a paroksha-vishaya.[ननु ज्ञानाभावविषयः अयमवभासः, न;अपरोक्षावभासत्वात् - VivaraNa]
- ajnAna-jnAna is an aparoksha-jnAna as the vishaya of this jnAna, namely ajnAna, is aparoksha-vishaya. jnAna-abhAva-jnAna is a paroksha-jnAna as the vishaya of this jnAna, namely jnAna-abhAva, is a paroksha-vishaya.

vishishTa-jnAna is not born out of visheshaNa-jnAna

Objection: Well. ajnAna-pratyaksha is vishishTa-vishayaka-pratyaksha. It is only the vishaya-visheshta-ajnAna that is sAkshi-bhAsya. Vishaya is the visheshaNa of ajnAna. So, ajnAna-pratyaksha has vishishTa-vishayinI-pratIti i.e. the vishaya of pratIti is ajnAna, which is itself vishishTa. Now, without prior visheshaNa-jnAna, there cannot be vishishTa-vishayaka-jnAna. This is so because vishishTa-jnAna is born of visheshaNa-jnAna. Thus, the contradiction would remain as prior to knowing ajnAna, you are supposed to know the vishaya-of-ajnAna.

Answer: Well, there is no pramANa for such a rule that vishishTa-jnAna is visheshaNa-jnAna-janya.

In NyAya, it is accepted that prior to the jnAna of ghaTatva-vishishTa-ghaTa, there is nirvikalpaka-jnAna of visheshaNa ghaTatva. However, in case of ghaTa-pratiyOgika-abhAva, which has pratiyOgitva and abhAvatva as visheshaNa, the prior nirvikalpaka-jnAna of these visheshaNa is not accepted. This is because all visheshaNa-vishishTa-abhAva padArtha are known only by savikalpaka-jnAna. Thus, NyAya itself accepts that the jnAna of pratiyOgitva and abhAvatva, which are the visheshaNa in ghaTa-pratiyOgika-abhAva and are absent prior to the abhAva-jnAna, is not required for ghaTa-pratiyOgika-abhAva jnAna. Thus, the rule adduced by them that “vishishTa-jnAna is visheshaNa-jnAna-janya” has vyavbhichAra and is hence not acceptable.

Similarly, in NyAya, in the case of mAnasa-pratyaksha of jnAna, there is a visheshaNa jnAnatva. That is to say, in the case of mAnasa-pratyaksha of jnAna, what shines is jnAnatva-vishishTa-jnAna. However, NyAya does not accept prior jnAna of jnAnatva. They hold that jnAtatva, which is hitherto unknown, shines as visheshaNa in the vishishTa-jnAna. Thus, here also, there is vyabhichAra of the proposed rule.

Thus, there can be no such rule which attributes janakatva to visheshaNa-jnAna vis-a-vis vishishTa-jnAna.

Discussion on vishishTa-vaishishTya-avagAhi-jnAna

This section is one of the most conceptual sections. However, we need to learn basic concepts first.

Let A = visheshya, B = visheshaNa-1, C = visheshaNa-2 present in B

vaishishTya = vishishTa-tva

The jnAna of C-vishishTa-B is a vishishTa-jnAna. Further, the vishishTa-tva (vaishishTyam) of this vishishTa-vastu i.e. C-vishishTa-B shines in A. That is to say, the vaishishTyam of vishishTa-vastu shines in visheshya. So, the jnAna of C-vishishTa-B-vishishTa-A is called a vishishTa-vaishishTya-avagAhi-jnAna (VVAJ).

B is visheshaNa of A. Thus, B has visheshaNatA. The avachchhedaka of visheshaNatA is C. So, C is visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka. VisheshaNatA-avachchhedaka-prakAraka-jnAna (VAPJ) is defined to be the jnAna of C-vishishTa-B.

Let us have the jnAna “दण्डी पुरुषः”. Here, A = purusha, B = danDa, C = danDatva.

So, VVAJ = the jnAna “दण्डी पुरुषः”, VAPJ = the jnAna “danDatva-vishishTa-danDa”.

In the previous objection, the siddhAntI negated the claim of the opponent that vishishTa-jnAna is born out of visheshaNa-jnAna and that prior visheshaNa-jnAna is a prerequisite for vishishTa-jnAna. The siddhAntI adduced the example of abhAva-jnAna as a vishishTa-jnAna to support his claim. In response, the opponent says that abhAva-jnAna

is not a vishishTa-jnAna but a VVAJ. Thus, though abhAva-jnAna does not have visheshaNa-jnAna-janyatva, yet it has VAPJ-janyatva. The opponent says VVAJ is VAPJ-janya. Let us study the objection and rebuttal.

Objection: You accept that ajnAna-pratyaksha is vishishTa-vaishishTya-vishayaka i.e. ajnAna-pratyaksha is VVAJ. This is so because ajnAna-pratyaksha in visheshya-Atman is always along with the perception of visheshaNa of ajnAna namely jnAna-virOdhitva and sa-vishayakatva. Without being with vishaya or without having jnAna-virOdhitva, there is no perception of ajnAna. ajnAna-qualified-with-these-two-visheshaNa appears in Atman. Therefore, (ज्ञानविरोधित्व-सविषयकत्व-विशिष्ट-अज्ञान)-विशिष्ट-आत्मनः प्रत्यक्षम् एव अज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षम्. Therefore, विशिष्टस्य-अज्ञानस्य वैशिष्ट्यम् आत्मनि भासते. अतो अज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षं विशिष्ट-वैशिष्ट्य-विषयकमेव. Therefore, ajnAna-pratyaksha is VVAJ. In ajnAna-pratyaksha, AtmA is the visheshya and ajnAna is the visheshaNa. Now, ajnAna has visheshaNatA. The visheshNatA-avachchhedaka are jnAna-virOdhitva and sa-vishayakatva. Thus, before VVAJ i.e. ajnAna-pratyaksha, you need to have VAPJ i.e. the jnAna of savishayakatva-vishishTa-ajnAna and jnAna-virOdhitva-vishishTa-ajnAna. This would, in turn, require the jnAna of vishaya. Now if jnAna of vishaya is present, ajnAna cannot be present. And thus, the contradiction would remain.

Answer: There is no pramANa that VAPJ has kAraNatA towards VVAJ.

The claim of pUrvapakshI is that without VAPJ, there cannot arise VVAJ such as “danDI purushah”. Because, first we know danDatva-vishishTa-danDa and then only danDa-vishishTa-purusha-jnAna can arise.

Similarly, pUrvapakshI says, like दण्डी पुरुषः, we have अहम् अज्ञः. Here, AtmA is akin to purusha and ajnAna is like danDa. And like danDatva, there are savishayakatva and jnAna-virOdhitva. Therefore, before VVAJ, i.e. before the knowledge अहम् अज्ञः, we need to have VAPJ i.e. we need to know savishayakatva-vishishTa-ajnAna and jnAna-virOdhitva-vishishTa-ajnAna. And ajnAna-vishaya having been known, there would no longer remain ajnAna. Thus, contradiction remains in bhAvarUpa-ajnAna paksha, so claims pUrvapakshI.

SiddhAntI explains - This very idea that VVAJ is kArya and preceding VAPJ is kAraNa is untenable as there is no pramANa therefor. Let the knowledge “दण्डी पुरुषः” be kArya, fine, but the kAryatA-avachchhedaka is simply pratyaksha-tva and not VVAJ-tva. And the kAraNatA-avachchhedaka is not VAPJ-tva, rather indriya-sannikrishTa-tva. When such a simple already accepted (क्लृप्त) kArya-kAraNa-bhAva is available, what is the need to accept a new kAryatA-avachchhedaka and kAraNatA-avachchhedaka.

Similarly, in case of knowledge वह्निमान् पर्वतः, the kAryatA-avachchhedaka is anumiti-tva and not VVAJ-tva. Similarly, kAraNatA-avachchhedaka is vyApti-jnAna-tva and not VAPJ-tva.

Similarly, for upamiti-jnAna and shAbda-jnAna.

The crux of the matter is - the kArya-kAraNa-bhAva can be explained by क्लृप्त-कार्य-कारण-भाव only, which is accepted by one and all and there is no need to imagine new avachchhedakAs for kAryatA and kAraNatA.

Objection: If we accept different kAryatA-avachchhedaka and kAraNatA-avachchhedaka for the four VVAJ such as pratyaksha-jnAna, anumiti-jnAna, upamiti-jnAna and shAbda-jnAna, then how can we justify the definite feeling of VVAJ-tva which arises in all the four jnAnAs?

Answer: See, blue-rUpa originates from different material, pot originates from different material. Thus, the kAryatA-avachchhedaka of blue-rUpa and pot are blue-ness and pot-ness respectively. Yet, when they combine, then their combined form is enough to give rise to a specific buddhi, namely नीलघटत्व, blue-pot-ness. There is no need to search for a different kAryatA-avachchhedaka. The combined form of separate kAryatA-avachchhedaka is enough to give rise to singular buddhi. Similarly, दण्डी पुरुषः has pratyakshatva as kAryatA-avachchhedaka, वह्निमान् पर्वतः has anumititva as kAryatA-avachchhedaka. But, seen together, they appear to have VVAJ-tva. There is no need to say that VVAJ-tva is some separate kAryatA-avachchhedaka. It just arises like blue-pot-ness on account of the combination of pratyakshatva and anumititva. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1137, says - विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यबुद्धित्वेन विशेषणतावच्छेदकप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेन च कार्यकारणभावे

मानाभावात् , प्रत्यक्षत्वादिरूपेण पृथक् पृथक् क्लृप्तकार्यकारणभावेनैवोपपत्तेः
विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यबुद्धित्वस्यार्थसमाजसिद्धत्वात्.

So far the siddhAntI has outrightly denied that VAPJ has any kAraNatA towards VVAJ.

And hence the objection against the ajnAna-pratyaksha “अहम् अज्ञः” does not hold good.

ALTERNATIVELY

However, now, as an alternative, the siddhAntI explains that the objection against ajnAna-pratyaksha is not valid **even if we accept** that VAPJ has kAraNatA towards VVAJ.

Even if we accept for the time being that VAPJ-tva is the kAraNatA-avachchhedaka and VVAJ-tva is the kAryatA-avachchhedaka, still there are some situations where VAPJ is not possible at all. There, the opponent also holds the VVAJ to arise as follows - “First visheshaNa-jnAna in visheshya AND then visheshaNAntara-jnAna in visheshaNa”. So, let the same logic be applied in all cases. Let ajnAna-pratyaksha also have VVAJ-tva through “First visheshaNa-jnAna in visheshya AND then visheshaNAntara-jnAna in visheshaNa”. And then, the objection would be untenable.

For example, let us take - रक्तदण्ड-वान् चैत्रः. Here, Chaitra is visheshya and danDa or रक्तदण्ड is the visheshaNa. The visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka is red-ness. Now, this knowledge रक्तदण्ड-वान् चैत्रः is VVAJ.

This knowledge can certainly sometimes be preceded by a definite VAPJ in the form of रक्तत्व-विशिष्ट-दण्ड-ज्ञान. However, sometimes it may not be preceded by VAPJ. Let there be a

doubt in the form of “दण्डो रक्तो न वा, whether the stick is red or not”. So, one has the doubt as to whether the stick is red or not. Therefore, there is no रक्तत्व-विशिष्ट-दण्ड jnAna. Thus, there is no VAPJ but the jnAna immediately before the jnAna रक्तदण्ड-वान् चैत्रः is a samshaya-jnAna. Still, it is seen that even in such cases, the jnAna in the form of रक्तदण्ड-वान् चैत्रः does arise through the mechanism of ‘विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्र च विशेषणान्तरम्’. That is to say, one first knows that Chaitra has a stick and then subsequently comes to know that the stick is red. Now this knowledge has the same vishaya as that of VVAJ i.e. knowledge which is preceded by VAPJ. Since in the doubt-case, there is no VAPJ, one may not say that it is VVAJ, but the fact remains that the knowledge रक्तदण्ड-वान् चैत्रः arising after a doubt “दण्डो रक्तो न वा” has the same AkAra as that of VVAJ. And since it has the same AkAra as that of VVAJ, what is the harm in holding the knowledge-arising-after-a-doubt also as VVAJ. That is why Advaita Siddhi, p. 1137, holds that VVAJ can arise even through the mechanism of ‘विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्र च विशेषणान्तरम्’.

इह च सामग्रीतुल्यत्वेन ‘विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्र च विशेषणान्तर’मिति न्यायेन विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यज्ञानसंभवात् ।

BAlabOdhinI clarifies it beautifully in p. 1140 - “रक्तदण्डवान् पुरुष” इति विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्य-अवगाहि-बोधे “दण्डो रक्तो न वा” एदादृश-संशयोत्तरं रक्तत्व-प्रकारक-निश्चय-अभावात् विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्य-अवगाहि-बोधो न भवितुमर्हति। किन्तु “दण्डो रक्तो न वा” इति संशयोत्तरम्-अपि ‘विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्र च विशेषणान्तरम्’ इति रीत्या विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्य-अवगाहि-बोध-समान-आकार-बोधो जायत एव। विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्य-अवगाहि-बोध-समान-आकार-बोधो अपि विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्य-अवगाहि इति उच्यते।

Similarly, in case of अहम् अज्ञः, first there will be visheshya-AtmA-jnAna, then the visheshaNā-jnAna i.e. perception of ajnAna, and then the visheshaNā of ajnAna, such as savishayakatva and jnAna-virOdhitva, are perceived. Hence, there is no contradiction in the bhAvarUpatva of ajnAna by it being the vishaya of a vishishTa-vaishishTya-avagAhi-jnAna.

So far is how it is explained in Advaita Siddhi. However, **LaghuchandrikA** explains this VVAJ a step further. LaghuchandrikA posits a rule as to when can VAPJ be required for VVAJ and when is VAPJ not required for VVAJ.

The crux of the explanation by LaghuchandrikA is as under.

Let A be the visheshya, B be the visheshaNā-1 located in A. Let C be the visheshanAntara, the visheshaNā-2 located in B. It is clear that C is the visheshaNāA-avachchhedaka as far as dharmI-B is concerned. LaghuchandrikA says that if there is a C1 as the visheshaNāA-avachchhedaka and there is C2 as dharmitA-avachchhedaka, then VAPJ is required for VVAJ. So, it brings in the concept of dharmitA-avachchhedaka and holds that if a dharmitA-avachchhedaka in addition to visheshaNāA-avachchhedaka is present, then VAPJ is needed for VVAJ. And if there is no dharmitA-avachchhedaka in addition to visheshaNāA-avachchhedaka, then VAPJ is not required and VVAJ can arise through 'विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्र च विशेषणान्तरम्'.

For example, let us take a VVAJ in the form of knowledge “घटवत् भूतलम्”. Here, A = bhUtala, B = ghaTa, C = ghaTa-tva. In this VVAJ, visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka is ghaTatva. There is no other dharmitA-avachchhedaka-dharma shining here in addition to visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka-dharma i.e. ghaTatva. Hence, such VVAJ does not require VAPJ in the form of knowledge “ghaTatva-vishishTa-ghaTa”.

However, in the case of VVAJ “रक्तदण्डवान् पुरुष”, A = purusha, B = danDa, C = rakta-tva. Here, the visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka-dharma is rakta-tva. But, in addition thereto, a dharmitA-avachchhedaka-dharma viz. danDatva is shining in the dharmI danDa. Therefore, the dharmitA-avachchhedaka-dharma of raktatva-dharma in raktatva-vishishTa-danDa is danDatva, which is different from raktatva. Hence, in such a situation, VAPJ is required for VVAJ.

BAlabOdhinI explains at p. 1141 - यस्मिन् धर्मिणि विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-धर्मो भासते, तत्र धर्मिणि यदि अन्यो धर्मो धर्मिता-अवच्छेदक-रूपेण भासते, तदा (विशिष्ट-वैशिष्ट्य-अवगाहि-ज्ञाने) विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-प्रकारक-निश्चयः अपेक्षते। यदि धर्मिणि धर्मिता-अवच्छेदक-रूपेण कश्चन धर्मो न भासते तत्र विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-प्रकारक-निश्चयो न अपेक्षते।

घटवत् इति प्रतीतौ विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-घटत्व-धर्मस्य धर्मो घटः। अस्मिन् धर्मिणि विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-घटत्व-धर्म-व्यतिरेकेण अन्यो धर्मः धर्मिता-अवच्छेदक-तया न भासते, अतः अत्र विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-प्रकारक-निश्चयस्य अपेक्षा नास्ति। किन्तु रक्तदण्डवान् इति विशिष्ट-वैशिष्ट्य-अवगाहि-बुद्धौ विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-धर्मो रक्तत्वम्, रक्तत्व-धर्मस्य धर्मो दण्डः। विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-रक्तत्व-धर्म-व्यतिरेकेण

दण्डत्व-धर्मः रक्तत्व-धर्मस्य धर्मिता-अवच्छेदक-रूपेण भासते। अतः अत्र विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-प्रकारक-निश्चयः अपि अपेक्षते।

Now in case of the impugned VVAJ, in ajnAna-pratyaksha, the two visheshaNa of ajnAna namely jnAna-virOdhitva and savishayakatva are both visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka. Neither is the dharmitA-avachchhedaka of the other. That is to say, jnAna-virOdhitva is not the dharmitA-avachchhedaka of savishayakatva. Nor is savishayakatva the dhamritA-avachchhedaka of jnAna-virOdhitva. These two visheshaNa of ajnAna are perceived as एकत्र द्वयम् like दण्डी कुण्डली चैत्रः. [एकत्र द्वयम् happens when there is simultaneous perception of more than one visheshaNa. In the case of sequential perception, such as in rakta-danDa, एकत्र द्वयम् is not possible]. It is not that one dharma is visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka and the other is dharmitA-avachchhedaka. Rather, both dharmAs are visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka. And there is no dharmitA-avachchhedaka in ajnAna-pratyaksha at all. Just as in the case of दण्डी कुण्डली चैत्रः, both danDa and kunDala appear as equivalent visheshaNa, both the dharmAs namely jnAna-virOdhitva and savishayakatva appear as equivalent visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka. There is no rule that dharmitA-avachchhedaka must be perceived. While in case of rakta-danDa-vAn-Chaitrah, danDatva appeared as dharmitA-avachchhedaka in raktatva-vishishTa-danDa, in the case of savishayakatva-vishishTa-ajnAna, jnAna-virOdhitva does not appear as dharmitA-avachchhedaka NOR in the case of jnAna-virOdhitva-vishishTa-ajnAna, savishayakatva appears as dharmitA-avachchhedaka. Rather, both savishayakatva and

jnAna-virOdhitva appear as visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka only without any dharmitA-avachchhedaka at all.

This being so, in VVAJ ajnAna-pratyaksha in the form of अहम् अज्ञः, there is no dharmitA-avachchhedaka in addition to visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka. And hence, as per the rule, VAPJ is not required for VVAJ. And hence, the objection by the opponent, which was based on the prior requirement of VAPJ, is untenable.

BAlabOdhinI explains in p. 1142 - एवम्-एव विषय-विशेषित-अज्ञानस्य विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहि-प्रतीतौ विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-प्रकारक-निश्चयस्य-अपेक्षा नास्ति । विषय-विशेषित-अज्ञानस्य प्रत्यक्षे ज्ञानविरोधित्व-सविषयकत्व-धर्मद्वय-विशिष्ट अज्ञानस्य वैशिष्ट्यं (आत्मनि) भासते । अस्यां प्रतीतौ ज्ञानविरोधित्वं सविषयकत्वं च धर्मद्वयं विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-रूपेण-एव भासते । एतयो-धर्मयो-मध्ये एकस्य धर्मस्य अपरधर्म-धर्मिता-अवच्छेदकरूपेण न भानम् । ज्ञानविरोधित्वविशिष्टेऽज्ञाने धर्मिणि सविषयकत्वरूपो धर्मो विशेषणता-अवच्छेदकरूपेण न भासते । एवं सविषयकत्वविशिष्टेऽज्ञाने धर्मिणि ज्ञानविरोधित्वधर्मो विशेषणता-अवच्छेदकतया न भासते । प्रदर्शितयोर्धर्मयोः एको विशेषणता-अवच्छेदकतया अपरस्तु धर्मिता-अवच्छेदकतया न भासते । किन्तु धर्मद्वयं तुल्यवत्-एव एकत्र द्वयम् इति रीत्या वा खले कपोतन्यायेन वा एकस्मिन्-अज्ञाने धर्मिणि विशेषणता-अवच्छेदकरूपेण भासते । यथा दण्डी कुण्डली वासस्वी चैत्र इति प्रतीतौ चैत्ररूपे धर्मिणि दण्डकुण्डलादीनि विशेषणानि युगपत् तुल्यरूपेणैव भासन्ते; किन्तु दण्डविशिष्टे चैत्रे कुण्डलं विशेषणं न भवति, एवमेव ज्ञानविरोधित्व-सविषयकत्व-धर्मद्वयम् अज्ञानरूपे धर्मिणि युगपद्-विशेषणता-अवच्छेदकरूपेण भासते । एकस्मिन् धर्मिणि एकाधिकविशेषणस्य युगपद्-भाने एकत्र द्वयम् इति रीत्या प्रतीतिः जायते । किन्तु विशेषणानां क्रमिकसम्बन्धबोधे तत् न भवति । एवमेव ज्ञानविरोधित्वं सविषयकत्वं च धर्मद्वयमज्ञाने धर्मिणि युगपद्भासते । किन्तु एक विशेषणविशिष्टेऽपरं विशेषणतया न भासते । एक विशेषणविशिष्टेऽपरस्य विशेषणतया भाने प्राग्विशेषणत्वेन भासमानं

वस्तु द्वितीयविशेषणस्य वैशिष्ट्यप्रतीतिकाले धर्मिता-अवच्छेदक-रूपेण भासते। विशेषणतावच्छेदकधर्मस्य प्रतीतौ धर्मिणि अवश्यमेव कस्यचित् धर्मस्य धर्मितावच्छेदकरूपेण प्रतीतिरपेक्षिता इत्यपि नियमो नास्ति। अतोऽज्ञानस्य विशिष्टवैशिष्ट्यावगाहिप्रत्यक्षे विशेषणता-अवच्छेदक-प्रकारक-निश्चयस्य-अपेक्षा नास्ति ।

Crux of VVAJ section

The crux of the VVAJ section is this. Advaita Siddhi holds that VAPJ does not have any kAraNatA towards VVAJ as there is no pramANa therefor. क्लृप्त-कार्य-कारण-भाव is enough to explain the perception of VVAJ. Hence, the objection is untenable.

Alternatively, even if VAPJ is accepted to have kAraNatA towards VVAJ, Advaita Siddhi states that in some cases such as that of VVAJ preceded by a doubt with respect to visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka, VVAJ is seen to arise through ‘विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्र च विशेषणान्तरम्’. Now, since VAPJ is not present, one may argue that the resultant knowledge is not VVAJ. However, since the AkAra of resultant knowledge is the same as that of VVAJ, it is logical to hold it as VVAJ. Hence, VVAJ can arise alternatively through ‘विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्र च विशेषणान्तरम्’, which may be accepted to be the mechanism behind the knowledge, अहम् अज्ञः. And hence, the objection is untenable.

Here, LaghuchandrikA adds a further dimension and posits a rule that VAPJ is required only when there is a dharmitA-avachchhedaka different from visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka in visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka-vishishTa-dharmI. In case there is no additional dharmitA-avachchhedaka, there is no need of prior VAPJ and the

VVAJ can result through 'विशेष्ये विशेषणं तत्र च विशेषणान्तरम्'. It may be noted that here, in this explanation by LaghuchandrikA, रक्तदण्डवान् चैत्रः is accepted to require VAPJ. However, in Advaita Siddhi, it was demonstrated through the example of preceding doubt, that VAPJ is not required even in this case of रक्तदण्डवान् चैत्रः. LaghuchandrikA explains that since the impugned VVAJ viz. ajnAna-pratyaksha has no dharmitA-avachchhedaka of visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka in visheshaNatA-avachchhedaka-vishishTa-dharmI, there is no requirement of VAPJ in production of VVAJ. And hence, the objection of the pUrvapakshI is untenable.

Thus, it is proved that there is sAkshi-pratyaksha of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna in अहम् अज्ञः.

3.2 Analysis of “त्वदुक्तम् अर्थं न जानामि”

We saw in the section 3 that अहमज्ञः is an example of सामान्यतः साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष of ajnAna. Now, we will see that त्वदुक्तमर्थं संख्यां वा शास्त्रार्थं वा न जानामि is an example of विशेषतः साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna. VivaraNa states in page 51 - इह च "त्वदुक्तमर्थं संख्यां वा शास्त्रार्थं वा न जानामि" इति विषयव्यावृत्तमज्ञानमनुभूय तच्छ्रवणादौ प्रवर्तते. The example shows that one experiences the ajnAna qualified by the vishaya, and subsequently proceeds to acquire knowledge about that vishaya.

VPS says on p.63 that sAkshi-chaitanya illuminates ajnAna, the vishaya-of-ajnAna and the ajnAna-vishaya-sambandha (which is in the nature of kArya-kAraNa). The relationship between ajnAna and vishaya is not that of coveror-covered as the vishaya, which is adhyasta, cannot be covered. Adhyasta cannot be covered during pratIti-kAla, as it is manifest. And when it is not manifest, then on account of being absent during non-pratIti owing to it being pratIti-mAtra-sharIra, cannot be covered. न च वाच्यं 'त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि' इति विषय-संबन्धि-अज्ञानम्-अनुभूयते, सम्बन्धः च अज्ञानस्य-आवरणत्वेन-आत्मनि दृष्टः

तत्-कथम्-अपलप्यत इति । साक्षिचैतन्येन

स्वस्मिन्-अध्यस्तानाम्-अज्ञान-विषय-तत्सम्बन्धानाम्-अनुभव-अङ्गीकारात्। सम्बन्धः च अज्ञान-विषययोः

कार्य-कारण-भाव-लक्षणो न-आवरक-आव्रियमाणत्व-लक्षणः, अध्यस्तस्य आवरण-अयोगात् । प्रतीतिकाले

तावत्-आवरणं व्याहतम् । अप्रतीतिकाले तु स्वयमेव नास्ति, द्विचन्द्रादिवदध्यस्तस्य प्रतीतिमात्र शरीरत्वात् । यदि

अध्यस्तम्-अपि-आव्रियेत तदा तत्प्रतिभासः कदाचिदपि न स्यात् ; अध्यस्तस्य मानाऽगोचरत्वेन तदावरणानिवृत्तेः।

The import of VPS here is that ajnAna qualified by vishesha-vishaya is illuminated by sAkshI.

The pratIti “त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि” means “I don’t know the artha which is stated by you”. The vishaya of this pratIti is artha-vishayaka-ajnAna. It basically means त्वत्-वाक्य-जन्य-ज्ञान-विषय-विषयक-अज्ञान-वान् अहम्. That is to say - the statement averred by you produced a jnAna. That jnAna has a vishaya (artha). I possess an ajnAna with respect to that vishaya.

For example, suppose a MImAmsaka says - शब्दो नित्यः. In response, someone states - त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि. He means thereby that he doesn’t know how the shabda is nitya. He doesn’t know the शब्द-गत-नित्यत्व. Similarly, if a scientist tells a sixth class student - Energy is the product of mass with square of speed of light. Then, the student would reply - त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि. He simply means that he does not know the relationship between energy, mass and speed of light. He means that शब्दगत-नित्यत्व or ऊर्जा-द्रव्यमान-प्रकाशगतीनाम्-संबन्धः are the object of his ignorance. He heard it, fine. But he does not know it. He cannot explain it to anyone. They are the objects of his ignorance.

Now, the opponent argues that the vishaya of pratIti “त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि” is not त्वत्-वाक्य-जन्य-ज्ञान-विषय-विषयक-अज्ञान. Rather, it is त्वत्-वाक्य-जन्य-ज्ञान-विषय-विषयक-प्रमाण-ज्ञान-अभाव. Thus, the pratiyOgI of this abhAva is त्वत्-वाक्य-जन्य-ज्ञान-विषय-विषयक-प्रमाण-ज्ञान. As per the rule of prior knowledge of pratiyOgI,

the abhAva-pratIti would require prior त्वत्-वाक्य-जन्य-ज्ञान-विषय-विषयक-प्रमाणज्ञान-स्य ज्ञानम्. Now, here त्वत्-वाक्य-जन्य-ज्ञान-विषय-विषयक-प्रमाणज्ञान is the visheshaNa of jnAna and hence it must be present. And therefore, there can be no abhAva of त्वत्-वाक्य-जन्य-ज्ञान-विषय-विषयक-प्रमाणज्ञान. Thus, there is self-contradiction if the pratIti “त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि” is accepted to be abhAva-vishayaka.

Objection: Let us take the case of anuvyavasAya. Suppose I know a pot. So, first there is a jnAna-1 named ghaTa-jnAna “अयं घटः” (vyavasAya). Subsequently, I get a jnAna-2 “I have ghaTa-jnAna, घटज्ञानवान् अहम्”. Now, this jnAna-2 has jnAna-1 as vishaya (ज्ञानविषयक ज्ञान). This jnAna-2 is called jnAna-1-anuvyavasAya. So, the vishaya-of-anuvyavasAya-jnAna is not pot, rather it is jnAna-1. Pot is the avachchedaka of the vishaya-of-anuvyavasAya-jnAna.

Now, let us replace pot by त्वदुक्तार्थ for understanding. In the impugned case, the sAkshAt-vishaya (pratiyOgI) of abhAva-jnAna (like anuvyavasAya-jnAna) is त्वदुक्तार्थ-विषयक-प्रमाणज्ञान. And त्वदुक्तार्थ is the avachchedaka of sAkshAt-vishaya of abhAva-jnAna. Thus, the abhAva-jnAna has त्वदुक्तार्थ-विषयक-प्रमाणज्ञान as sAkshAt-vishaya, whereas त्वदुक्तार्थ is the paramparayA-vishaya. Self-contradiction arises only if one has sAkshAt-jnAna of x, and sAkshAt-jnAna-abhAva of x is being posited. But that is not the case here, we are positing sAkshAt-jnAna-abhAva while having only the paramparayA-jnAna of त्वदुक्तार्थ. So, we are not saying that we have sAkshAt-jnAna of त्वदुक्तार्थ and sAkshAt-jnAna-abhAva of त्वदुक्तार्थ. Rather, we

are saying, we have (sAkshAt-(pramANa-)jnAna)-abhAva of त्वदुक्तार्थ and paramparayA-jnAna of त्वदुक्तार्थ. So, there is no contradiction.

Let me explain. Suppose a MImAmsaka says - शब्दो नित्यः. In response, I being a NaiyAyika, would state - त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि. I don't know how shabda is nitya. I don't know the शब्द-गत-नित्यत्व. I have the absence of शब्द-गत-नित्यत्व-विषयक-प्रमाणज्ञान. Here, there is no sAkshAt-connection with त्वदुक्तार्थ and NaiyAyika, it is only स्व-विषयी-भूत-प्रमा-ज्ञान-अवच्छेदक-त्व sambandha between NaiyAyika and त्वदुक्तार्थ. So, paramparayA-jnAna of त्वदुक्तार्थ is present, whereas (sAkshAt-jnAna)-abhAva-of-त्वदुक्तार्थ is claimed. So, there is no contradiction.

Thus, basically, my claim is - “त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि” only illustrates that I don't have pramANa-jnAna of त्वदुक्तार्थ sAkshAt. त्वदुक्तार्थ appears as the avachchhedaka of pramANa-jnAna. Thus, while there is paramparayA-jnAna of त्वदुक्तार्थ, the abhAva is being stated of pramANa-jnAna of त्वदुक्तार्थ. Hence, there is no contradiction.

Advaita Siddhi, p. 1187 explains the position of the opponent - ननु साक्षात्-त्वदुक्तार्थ-विषयं प्रमाणज्ञानं मयि नास्ति-इति-एतद्-विषयकम्-उदाहृतज्ञानम् , तत्-च न साक्षात्-अर्थविषयम् ; प्रमाणज्ञान-अवच्छेदकतया-अर्थस्य भानात्, अतो न व्याघात इति चेत्.

Answer: Advaita Siddhi replies - न । साक्षात्त्वदुक्तार्थमवेत्य हि तदभावो ग्राह्यः । तज्ज्ञानं च न साक्षिणा; स्वस्मिंस्तादृक्प्रमाणज्ञानाभावात् , अन्यनिष्ठं तु शब्दादिना ग्राह्यम् । शब्दादिश्च त्वदुक्तार्थं बोधयन्नेव तद्विषयत्वं ज्ञाने बोधयेत् । तथाच प्रथमतस्त्वदुक्तार्थविषयकं साक्षादेव ज्ञानमागतमिति तन्निषेधे न कुतो व्याघातः ? Basically, it says

- If the abhAva of sAkshAt-tvaduktArtha-vishayaka-pramANa-jnAna is being posited, then as per rule, one should have jnAna of sAkshAt-tvaduktArtha-vishayaka-pramANa-jnAna. But since sAkshAt-tvaduktArtha-vishayaka-pramANa-jnAna is not present, sAkshI cannot perceive that. Hence, that pramANa-jnAna has to be obtained from others. Now, pramANa-jnAna, such as in the form of shabda, cannot produce only pramANa-jnAna without making known त्वदुक्तार्थ. Therefore, the contradiction would remain because साक्षात्-त्वदुक्तार्थ-विषयक-प्रमाणज्ञान becomes present whose abhAva was being claimed.

Objection: Let there be सामान्यतः jnAna of त्वदुक्तार्थ, and विशेषतः jnAna-abhAva of त्वदुक्तार्थ. For example, त्वदुक्तार्थ can be सामान्यतः known प्रमेयत्व-आदि-रूपेण, whereas त्वदुक्तार्थत्व-रूपेण, it may not be known.

Answer: This too is untenable as the pratiyOgI-jnAna is kAraNa for abhAva-jnAna प्रतियोगिता-अवच्छेदक-रूपेण only and not sAmAnyatah. So, if vishesha-prakAraka-jnAna-abhAva is being postulated, it would require (vishesha-prakAraka-jnAna)-jnAna which would in turn require vishesha-prakAraka-jnAna. And hence, the contradiction would remain. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1189 says - अत एव—विशेषस्य स्वरूपतो (सामान्यतो) ज्ञानेऽपि विशेषप्रकारकज्ञानाभावो न व्याहत-इत्यपास्तम्.

Objection: Let us take a common example. Let there be a yathArtha-jnAna of a gooseberry on your palm. Now, the vishaya of this करतलामलकज्ञान is आमलक.

However, being yathArtha-jnAna, this jnAna must also have आमलकत्व as the vishaya. Because, it is well-known that yathArtha-jnAna has स्व-विषय-व्यावर्तक-धर्म-विषयत्वम्. This means, yathArtha-jnAna has the distinguishing dharma, of its vishaya, as its vishaya. आमलक is the vishaya of करतलामलकज्ञान. The vyAvartaka-dharma of swa-vishaya i.e. yathArtha-jnAna-vishaya i.e. करतलामलकज्ञान i.e. vyAvartaka-dharma of Amalaka is आमलकत्व. The yathArtha-jnAna thus has स्व-विषय-व्यावर्तक-धर्म-विषयत्वम्.

Now, in the of impugned jnAna, त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि, there is no स्व-विषय-व्यावर्तक-धर्म-विषयत्वम्. While there is a sAmAnyajnAna of त्वदुक्तार्थ, there is no स्व-विषय-व्यावर्तक-धर्म-विषयत्वम् in this sAmAnyajnAna. This negation of स्व-विषय-व्यावर्तक-धर्म-विषयत्वम् is being done by त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1190, says - करतलामलकज्ञाने स्वविषयव्यावर्तकधर्मविषयत्वं प्रसिद्धमिह निषिध्यत इत्यपि, न; त्वदुक्तत्वस्यापि मदुक्ताद्व्यावर्तकत्वेन सामान्यतो व्यावर्तकधर्मविषयत्वस्य निषेद्धमशक्यत्वात् ।

Answer: Not so. Even in त्वदुक्तार्थ, there is a स्वविषयव्यावर्तकधर्म namely त्वदुक्त. This त्वदुक्त dharma distinguishes it from मदुक्त etc. त्वदुक्तार्थ-tva is not the only स्वविषयव्यावर्तकधर्म. The dharma named त्वदुक्त is also a स्वविषयव्यावर्तकधर्म. Therefore, your claim that त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि negates स्व-विषय-व्यावर्तक-धर्म-विषयत्वम् is incorrect.

Objection: In त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि, it is neither vishesha-jnAna-abhAva nor त्वदुक्तार्थ-vishayaka-jnAna-abhAva which shines. Let it be

(त्वदुक्तार्थ-विशेष्यक)-(विशेष-प्रकारक)-jnAna-abhAva. That is to say, it is TVVP-jnAna-abhAva which appears. Now, even though the pratiyogI TVVP-jnAna is being known TVVP-jnAna-tvena, still TVVP-jnAna-abhAva is possible. This is so because in pratiyOgI-jnAna, the prakAra is TVVP-jnAa-tva and visheshya is TVVP-jnAna. This is different from the prakAra and visheshya shining in TTVP-jnAna. Hence, there is no contradiction.

In simple words, the opponent is claiming घटत्व-प्रकारक-घट-विशेष्यक-ज्ञान-अभाव in case त्वदुक्तार्थ is घट. Now, since pratiyOgI-jnAna is required beforehand, one needs to have (घटत्व-प्रकारक-घट-विशेष्यक-ज्ञान)-jnAna. In this pratiyOgI-jnAna, the visheshya is घटत्व-प्रकारक-घट-विशेष्यक-ज्ञान and prakAra is घटत्व-प्रकारक-घट-विशेष्यक-ज्ञान-tva. This is different from the prakAra and visheshya of TTVP-jnAna, whose abhAva is being postulated. So, there is no contradiction.

See, the pratiyOgI-jnAna is not घटत्व-प्रकारक, rather, it is (घटत्व-प्रकारक-घट-विशेष्यक-ज्ञान-tva)-प्रकारक. Similarly, pratiyOgI-jnAna is not घट-विशेष्यक, rather, it is (घटत्व-प्रकारक-घट-विशेष्यक-ज्ञान)-विशेष्यक. Hence, there is no contradiction at all.

Advaita Siddhi presents this argument of the opponent on p. 1191 - तथा हि न हि विशेषज्ञानाभावस्त्वदुक्तार्थविषयकज्ञानाभावो वात्र प्रतीयते, किंतु त्वदुक्तार्थविशेष्यकविशेषप्रकारकज्ञानाभावः, तत्र च त्वदुक्तार्थविशेष्यकविशेषप्रकारकज्ञानत्वेन प्रतियोगिज्ञानेऽपि तादृक्प्रकारकतद्विशेष्यकज्ञानाभावसंभवः;

अस्य ज्ञानस्य ज्ञाने विशेष्ये विशेषप्रकारकत्वप्रकारकत्वात् , यत्रापि त्वदुक्तविशेषं न जानामीत्यभिलापः,
तत्राप्येवमेव व्याहृत्यभावः कथंचिदुन्नेयः ।

Answer: The argument is not valid on account of contradiction with experience. If there is neither vishesha-jnAna-abhAva nor त्वदुक्तार्थ-jnAna-abhAva, then it implies that vishesha-jnAna and त्वदुक्तार्थ-jnAna are present. If they are present, then there will be vishesha-vishayaka-vyavahAra (विशेषं जानामि) and त्वदुक्तार्थ-vishayaka-vyavahAra (त्वदुक्तम् अर्थं जानामि). But that is not seen to happen. Hence, the argument is incorrect. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1195 - न, अनुभवविरोधात्, विशेषज्ञानाभावस्य त्वदुक्तार्थज्ञानाभावस्य वाऽनभ्युपगमे तद्विषयज्ञानसत्त्वेन तद्व्यवहारापत्तेश्च । न चैवं दृश्यते ।

Further, in the case of स्वतःप्रामाण्यवाद, when there is pramA-jnAna, then there is perception of the prakAra and visheshya of pramA-jnAna as well. Thus, when there is pratiyOgI-jnAna i.e. when there is jnAna of TVVP-jnAna, there will necessarily be TV-tva-jnAna and VP-tva-jnAna. Thus, TVVP-jnAna will be present. Hence, it will certainly be a contradiction to say that there is TVVP-jnAna-abhAva. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1195, says - स्वतःप्रामाण्यमते तु तत्प्रकारकत्वे तद्विशेष्यकत्वे च गृह्यमाणे तद्वत्त्वग्रहणस्यावश्यकतया तदंशे तत्प्रकारकतद्विशेष्यकत्वस्य तादृशप्रतियोगिज्ञाने संभवात् स्पष्ट एव व्याघातः.

However, in case of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna-paksha of siddhAntI, whether it is bhAvarUpa-ajnAna or vishaya-of-ajnAna or the jnAna-virOdhitva, savishayakatva

dharma located in ajnAna or the virOdha-nirUpaka-jnAna, these all are sAkshi-vedya.

And hence, there is no contradiction. भावरूपाज्ञानपक्षे तु सर्वस्यापि साक्षिवेद्यतया न व्याघात इत्युक्तम् ।

Scope of VivaraNa statement

VivaraNa states in page 51 - इह च "त्वदुक्तमर्थं संख्यां वा शास्त्रार्थं वा न जानामि" इति विषयव्यावृत्तमज्ञानमनुभूय तच्छ्रवणादौ प्रवर्तते. Here AchArya takes three items namely artha, sankhya and shAstra. Riju-vivaraNa explains them to refer to general people, tArkika and to mImAmsaka respectively. It is clear that people perceive the ajnAna qualified with vishaya and then proceed for shravaNa to remove the ajnAna.

Now, one may (tArkika) argue that artha is known but the sankhyA located therein is not known and hence one says "त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि". To remove this objection, AchArya writes - "त्वदुक्तं संख्यां न जानामि" because sankhyA, being a guNa, cannot have sankhyAntara being a guNAntara.

Now, one may (mImAmsaka) may argue that त्वदुक्तमर्थम् is paroksha-tayA-known but aparOksha-tayA unknown and hence one states - "त्वदुक्तमर्थं न जानामि". To remove this objection, AchArya writes - "त्वदुक्तं शास्त्रार्थं न जानामि". Now, apUrva etc being nitya-parOksha-shAstra-artha cannot be then explained by the opponent.

Thus, all three aspects are covered by the VivaraNa statement. The crux of the matter is that this statement demonstrates the perception of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna qualified by vishaya.

3.3 Analysis of saushupta-pratyaksha

Just as “अहमज्ञो, माम्-अन्यं च न जानामि” was demonstrated to be an example of “सामान्यतः साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष” of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna and “त्वदुक्तमर्थं संख्यां वा शास्त्रार्थं वा न जानामि” was explained to be an example of “विशेषतः साक्षिप्रत्यक्ष”, similarly the parAmarsha in the form of “एतावन्तं कालं सुखमहमस्वाप्सं न किञ्चिदवेदिषम्” proves the saushupta-sAkshi-pratyaksha of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna.

Mechanism of parAmarsha (recollection/smriti) of saushupta-pratyaksha

The recollection, after waking, shows that bhAvarUpa-ajnAna was experienced as pratyaksha in sushupti by sAkshI. Had there been no sAkshi-pratyaksha of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna in sushupti, this recollection after waking is not possible. Therefore, BALabOdhinI says on p. 1198, अतः सुप्त-उत्थितस्य परामर्शेन कल्प्यं सौषुप्त-अज्ञान-प्रत्यक्षं भावरूप-अज्ञान-साधकम्. Thus, saushupta-ajnAna-pratyaksha is “imagined” on the force of recollection. And this saushupta-ajnAna-pratyaksha establishes the bhAvarUpa-ajnAna. This is the sequence.

Objection: sAkshI is defined by you as ajnAna-upahita-chaitanya. Now, chaitanya, ajnAna and ajnAna-chaitanya-sambandha are all beginningless. sAkshi-pratyaksha is nitya, eternal. This being so, it is natural that sAkshi-pratyaksha is not destroyed. And if it is not destroyed, then samskAra cannot arise. This is so because without jnAna-nAsha, samskAra cannot be

produced. And without samskAra, there is no possibility of recollection. Basically, smriti is caused by anubhava. However, anubhava is in the distant past, whereas smriti is in present. So, a vyApAra in the interim must be accepted otherwise past-anubhava cannot be claimed as kAraNa of smriti. BAlabOdhinI, p. 1201, says -
विना व्यापारम् अनुभवस्य व्यवहित-स्मरण-रूप-कार्यस्य अजनकत्वात्। कार्य-अव्यवहित-प्राक्-काले व्यापार-व्यापारिणोः अन्यतरस्य-अपि असत्त्वे अकारणत्व-प्रसङ्गात्। अतः स्मरण-अव्यवहित-प्राक्-काले अतीत-अनुभव-जन्य-संस्कारो व्यापारो वर्तते इति अवश्यम् अङ्गीकार्यम्; अन्यथा अनुभवस्य स्मरण-जनकत्वमेव न स्यात्।

Now, sAKshi-pratyaksha being nitya, it cannot produce samskAra and hence it cannot result in recollection, smriti. On the other hand, if you accept samskAra, then you contradict the nityatva of sAkshi-anubhava.

If you argue that sAkshI-padArtha is destroyed on account of destruction of upAdhi ajnAna, then that is not feasible either as ajnAna is not removed till Brahma-jnAna arises.

Therefore, your claim that there is sAkshi-pratyaksha of bhAvarUpa-ajnAna in sushupti resulting in recollection thereof in waking is not tenable.

Answer: Your claim in a nutshell is basically this - अज्ञानस्य साक्षिप्रत्यक्षं नित्यम् (ज्ञानम्)। नित्य-ज्ञानस्य संस्कार-अजनकत्वात् संस्कार-अभावे स्मरणस्य-अनुपपत्तिः। This objection is taken up and answered in VivaraNa, p. 171, as under - “ननु अज्ञान-सुख-अनुभवयोः साक्षिचैतन्यस्य च अविनाशिनः

संस्कार-अभावे कथम् उत्थितस्य त्रयाणाम्-अनुस्मरणं स्यात्? उच्यते - अज्ञान-गत-चैतन्य-आभास-जन्य-उपाधित्वात् अज्ञान-सुख-साक्षी-विकल्प-अनुभवस्य, अज्ञान-अवस्था-भेदेन चैतन्य-आभासानां भिन्नत्वात् तद्-विनाश-संस्कारजं स्मरणम् अज्ञान-सुख-साक्षिचैतन्य-आकारम् अज्ञान-विशिष्ट-आत्मा-आश्रयम्-एव सम्भाव्यते। न अन्तःकरण-आश्रयम् इति।”

The meaning of VivaraNa-vAkya is this - In the absence of samskAra of imperishable ajnAna-anubhava, sukha-anubhava and sAkshi-chaitanya, how can there arise the recollection of these three namely ajnAna, sukha and sAkshI? Here it is said - ajnAna transforms as (avasthA-)ajnAna-AkArA-avidyA-vritti, sukha-AkArA-avidyA-vritti and sAkshi-AkArA-avidyA-vritti. In those vrittis, there is chaitanya-AbhAsa. These chaitanya-AbhAsa are perishable as the vritti are perishable. And thus, samskAra can very well arise which can in turn give rise to smriti. Tattva Dīpana, explain son p. 171, अज्ञानं स्व-सुख-साक्षि-आकारेण परिणमते, तत्र च परिणत-अज्ञाने चैतन्य-आभास उपजायते, तस्मात् अज्ञान-आदि-विक्षेप-अनुभवः।

The concept is elucidated in SiddhAnta Bindu, p. 164, where it is said that avasthA-ajnAna-AkArA, sukha-AkArA and sAkshi-AkarA avidyA-vritti-traya are admitted in SiddhAnta. avasthA-ajnAna-AkArA-vritti is admitted because of our subsequent experience in the form of - I did not myself, God, another persons, AkAsha, air, fire etc. I did not know anything. This shows that my experience of ajnAna was sarva-vishaya-vyAvritta. Therefore, avasthA-ajnAna-AkArA-avidyA-vritti has to be admitted and mUla-ajnAna-AkArA-avidyA-vritti alone will not suffice because

mUla-ajnAna has only shuddha-chaitanya as the vishaya. However, one must keep in mind that mUla-ajnAna-AkArA-avidyA-vritti also has to be admitted in sushupti because it is always accepted except during pralaya. NyAya-ratnAvalI says in p. 164 - इदं तु बोध्यम्। मूलाज्ञानाकारा-अपि-वृत्तिः सुषुप्तौ अवश्यं वाच्या। प्रलय-अन्य-काले सर्वदा-एव तत्-स्वीकारात्।

Advaita Siddhi explains the entire argument and concludes as follows in p. 1109 by holding sAkshI to be avidyA-vritti-pratibimbata-chaitanya: न च स्मरणपक्षे संस्कारानुपपत्तिः; अज्ञानस्य-अज्ञानवृत्ति-प्रतिबिम्बित-साक्षिभास्यत्वेन वृत्तिनाशादेव संस्कारोपपत्तेः, अज्ञान-वृत्ति-प्रतिबिम्बित-चैतन्यस्यैव साक्षिपदार्थत्वात् ।

Objection: If you hold that ajnAna is known by ajnAna-AkAra-avidyA-vritti-pratibimbata-chaitanya, then in waking, during the absence of such vritti, there will be no ajnAna-anubhava and hence there can arise samshaya and viparyaya with respect to ajnAna. But that does not seem to happen as we always have jnAna of ajnAna. Therefore, your position is not correct.

Answer: ajnAna is sAkshi-bhAsya and hence there is no ajnAna of ajnAna. Since samshaya and viparyaya have ajnAna as the upAdAna, and since ajnAna has no ajnAna about itself, it follows that there is no samshaya and viparyaya about ajnAna either. BALabOdhinI, p. 1210 says - साक्षिसिद्धे वस्तुनि अज्ञान-अभावात् अज्ञान-गोचर- अज्ञानम्-एव अप्रसिद्धम्। न हि भवति अज्ञानम् अज्ञातम् इति। संशय-विपर्यय-योः उपादानम् अज्ञानमेव यस्मिन् नास्ति, तत्र उपादान-अभावात् कथं संशय-आदयः स्युः इति।

And in case doubts regarding the visheshaNa of ajnAna such as bhAva-rUpa-tva etc are being raised, that is desirable. Because bhAva-rUpa-tva, anAditva etc are not sAkshi-bhAsya. Rather they are pramANa-gamya. Hence, it is logical that they are ajnAna-vishaya and hence in the absence of pramANa, there arises doubts in respect of them. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1210, says - न च-जागरेऽप्यज्ञानस्य वृत्तिवेद्यत्वे वृत्त्यभावदशायां संशयाद्यापत्तिरिति वाच्यम्; अज्ञान-विषय-अज्ञान-अभावेन तत्-अयोगात्, संशयादेस्तत्कारणीभूताज्ञानसमानविषयत्वनियमात् । भावत्वादिना संशये त्विष्टापत्तिरेव; भावत्वादेः साक्षिवेद्यत्व-अभावेन-अज्ञानविषयत्वात् , अज्ञानस्य स्वरूपेणैव साक्षिवेद्यत्वात् ।

Objection: Well, just as you accept that bhAvarUpa-tva etc are no sAkshi-vedya but ajnAna by swarUpa is sAkshi-vedya, similarly, let jnAna-abhAva be sAkshi-vedya by swarUpa. Let sapratyOgitvena only jnAna-abhAva have the requirement of pratiyOgi-jnAna etc or pramANa such as anupalabdhi. If you do not admit this, then how can you explain the cognition of abhAva when we have jnAna in the form of “prameyam”. Afterall, when we have this jnAna “prameyam”, then even without pratiyOgi-jnAna etc, we have the perception of abhAva by swarUpa being within the ambit of prameya. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1211 says, ननु तदा ज्ञानाभावोऽपि स्वरूपेणैव भासताम् , सप्रतियोगिकत्वेनाभवज्ञान एव प्रतियोगिज्ञानस्य हेतुत्वात् , अन्यथा ‘प्रमेय’मिति ज्ञानेऽप्यभावो न भासेतेति।

And if this is so, then jnAna-abhAva in sushupti itself will be sAkshi-bhAsya by swarUpa and there is no need to accept a bhAvarUpa ajnAna.

Answer: It is not possible for abhAva to be sAkshi-vedya by swarUpa. If it were to be sAkshi-bhAsya by swarUpa, then what would be the form of its cognition? Only “No”. However, abhAva is experienced in the form of ghaTa-abhAva, paTa-abhAva etc. Perception in the form of “No” is simply inadmissible. BALabOdhinI, p. 1211, says - यदि-अभावः प्रतियोगि-ज्ञान-नैरपेक्ष्येण स्वरूपतः साक्षिवेद्यो भवेत्, तदा तादृश-अभाव-प्रतीतेः आकारः कीदृशः स्यात्? न इति एव स्यात्। (किन्तु) घटो न, पटो न, इति एव अभाव-प्रतीतेः आकारः प्रसिद्धः, न इति एतावत्-मात्र-आकारा प्रतीतिः सर्वथा अप्रसिद्धा एव। Therefore, Advaita Siddhi says on p. 1211 - साक्षिणा तावन्न स्वरूपेणाभाववाग्राहनम् । तस्य साक्षात्साक्ष्यवेद्यत्वात् ।

Similarly, jnAna-abhAva in sushupti cannot be known by shabda etc as they are absent then. Not even by anupalabdhi, because anupalabdhi cannot give rise to knowledge without pratiyOgi-jnAna. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1211, says - नापि शब्दादिना तदानीं तेषामभावात् । नाप्यनुपलब्ध्या; तस्याः प्रतियोगिज्ञाननिरपेक्षाया अजनकत्वात् ।

Objection: Let jnAna-abhAva be some different kind of abhAva other than pot-abhAva, cloth-abhAva etc. Let it be some different kind of abhAva which is sAkshi-vedya by swarUpa. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1212 - दृष्टाभावान्तरविलक्षणस्वभाव एवायमभाव इति स्वरूपेण साक्षिवेद्योऽस्तु।

Answer: In sushupti, there is abhAva of savikalpaka-jnAna. There is only nirvikalpaka-jnAna. If jnAna-abhAva were to be known by nirvikalpaka-jnAna, then it would amount that jnAna-rUpa is bhAvarUpa only.

savikalpaka-jnAna is possible only when antah-karaNa is present. In sushupti, since antah-karaNa is merged into ajnAna, savikalpaka-jnAna is impossible. If you hold that jnAna-abhAva is known in sushupti through nirvikalpaka-jnAna, then that would amount to bhAvarUpatva of jnAna-abhAva. Or else, it would just amount to defining something, which is actually bhAvarUpa, as abhAva. It would be merely a matter of definition wherein actually, it is bhAvarUpa.

Advaita Siddhi, p. 1212 says - निर्विकल्पकबुद्धिवेद्यत्वे भावत्वस्यैवौचित्यात् , अन्यथा परिभाषामात्रापत्तेः ।
BALabOdhinI clarifies on p. 1212 - जाग्रत-स्वप्न-योः अन्तःकरण-सत्ता-प्रयुक्तमेव सविकल्पक-ज्ञानं जायते, सुषुप्तौ अन्तःकरणस्य विलीनत्वात् सविकल्पक-ज्ञान-असम्भवात्। अतो ज्ञानाभावस्य सुषुप्तौ निर्विकल्पक बुद्धि वेद्यत्वं वाच्यम्; तथात्वे भावत्वस्य-एव-आपत्तेः; अन्यथा परिभाषा-मात्रत्व-आपत्तेः। निर्विकल्पक-बुद्धि-वेद्यस्य भावस्य अभाव-नाम्ना व्यवहारात्, भावे अभाव-नाम्नः परिभाषा-मात्रं स्यात्; परिभाषा-मात्रेण वस्तु-वैलक्षण्यं न स्यात् इति भावः।

Objection: Well, in that case, how do you explain the sAkshi-pratyaksha in the form of “न अवेदिषम्”? This recollection shows that the anubhava was qualified with jnAna-virOdhitva. Now, since the anubhava was nirvikalpaka, the visheshaNa of ajnAna such as jnAna-virOdhitva and sa-vishayakatva should not have been experienced. But that is contradicted by the recollection. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1212 - ननु ज्ञानविरोधित्वादेस्तदानुभवेन ‘नवेदिषमि’ति तेनाकारेण कथं परामर्शः?

Answer: There is no recollection of jnAna-virOdhitva and sa-vishayakatva in waking. There is anubhava of jnAna-virOdhitva and sa-vishayakatva in waking. Just as despite the non-experience of ahamartha in sushupti, there is recollection in the form of “I did not know then” on account of tAdAtmya-adhyAsa of antah-karaNa (ahamartha) with sAkshI in waking, similarly, despite the non-experience of jnAna-virOdhitva and sa-vishayakatva in sushupti, on account of tAdAtmya-adhyAsa in waking, it appears as if it is being recollected. न; द्रष्टुर्हन्तःकरणतादात्म्येनाहमुल्लेखस्येव ज्ञानविरोधित्वादेरपि तदैवानुभूयमानत्वेन तदंशे परामर्शत्वानभ्युपगमात् , सुषुप्तिकालीनस्य द्रष्टुरेव परामृष्टत्वात् ।

BAlabOdhinI explains in p. 1213 - अहं न किञ्चित्-अवेदिषम्-इति स्मृतौ अहमंशे यथा न स्मृतित्वं किन्तु अनुभवत्वमेव, एवमेव स्मर्यमाण-अज्ञानस्वरूपे ज्ञानविरोधित्वादेः अपि अनुभूयमानत्वम्-एव न स्मर्यमाणत्वं, सुषुप्तौ ज्ञानविरोधित्वादेः अननुभवात् । सुषुप्तिकालीन-साक्षि-आकारा अविद्यावृत्त्या द्रष्टैवानुभूतः, स एव स्मर्यते, न तु अहमर्थः । सुषुप्तौ अहमर्थस्य-अननुभवात् । सुषुप्तौ अनुभूतमेव स्मर्यते, अनुभूतं तु तदानीमेवानुभूयते न स्मर्यते इत्यर्थः ॥

The basic idea is this - one can recollect only that which was earlier experienced. In sushupti, it was the sAkshI which was experienced through sAkshI-AkArA-avidyA-vritti. However, the recollection uses the word “I” despite there being the non-experience of ahamartha in sushupti. This is explained by pointing to the adhyAsa of ahamartha and sAKshI. Though the recollection is of experienced-sAkshI, due to superimposition of ahamartha in sAkshI, we use the word “I” after waking up, which is experienced now. On the same analogy, jnAna-virOdhitva and sa-vishayakatva, are explained.

Here, LaghuchandrikA explains the advaita-siddhAnta by referring to SiddhAnta Bindu and NyAya-ratnAvalI, p. 165. It holds that in sushupti, ajnAna-anubhava is qualified by jnAna-virOdhitva and sa-vishayakatva.

Just as abhAva is always experienced coupled with pratiyOgi-anuyoga-vishishTatva and abhAvatva; and; just as jnAna is always experienced coupled with savishayaka-tva and jnAna-tva; similarly, ajnAna is always perceived coupled with ajnAna-tva (jnAna-virOdhitva) and savishayaka-tva. Shuddha-ajnAna is never perceived. Just as jnAna and abhAva are not perceived by nirvikalpaka-buddhi, similarly ajnAna is never experienced through nirvikalpaka-jnAna. NyAya-ratnAvalI, p. 165, says - यथाऽभावस्य प्रतियोग्यनुयोगिविशिष्टत्व-अभावत्वा-रूपाभ्यामेव, ज्ञानस्य सविषयकत्व-ज्ञानत्वा-भ्यामेव च प्रत्यक्षे भानं, तथैवाज्ञानस्य सविषयकत्व-अज्ञानत्वा-भ्यामेव प्रत्यक्षे भानं न तु शुद्ध-अज्ञानस्य, तयोः इव तस्यापि निर्विकल्पक-अवेद्यत्वात् ।

Accordingly, the ajnAna-AkArA-avidyA-vritti in sushupti experiences the ajnAna which is qualified by jnAna-virOdhitva and savishayakatva. The absence of antah-karana (ahamartha) is responsible for non-perception of other adjectives of ajnAna. These two adjectives are also perceived along with ajnAna. किञ्च, तदुभयरूपविशिष्टत्वेनाज्ञानस्मृतिः तादृशीमेव स्वकारणीभूतामविद्यावृत्ति कल्पयति । एवं चाज्ञानत्वादि-संसर्ग-अन्यसंसर्ग-विषयकवृत्तौ-एव-अहङ्कारस्य हेतुत्वं कल्प्यम्।

Objection: Well, if this is so i.e. if ajnAna is known by ajnAna-AkArA-avidyA-vritti-pratibimbata-chaitanya, then such ajnAna-anubhava

is present in jAgrat also. So, it is a dhArAvAhika-anubhava. Why to use the term parAmarsha i.e. smriti for that? Advaita Siddhi, p. 1213, says - नन्वज्ञानवृत्तिप्रतिबिम्बितचैतन्यरूपस्याज्ञानानुभवस्य जाग्रत्यपि विद्यमानत्वात् कथमज्ञानस्मरणम् ? न हि धारावाहिकेषु अनुभवेषु तुल्यसामग्रीकेषु स्मरणव्यवहारः; तथाच धारावाहिकोऽज्ञानानुभव इति वक्तव्यम्, न तु परामर्श इति?

Answer: True. In case of only-ajnAna-amsha (jnAna-virOdhitva-sa-vishayakatva-vishishTa-ajnAna), there is dhArAvAhika-jnAna only. However, it is the sushupti-vishishTa-ajnAna which is the object of recollection and not only-ajnAna. Sushupti or nidrA is stated here as vritti following Patanjali Yoga Sutra which states - ‘अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रा’. Advaita Siddhi explains it on p. 1214 - सत्यम् । सुषुप्त्याख्यायास्तामस्या अज्ञानवृत्तेर्नाशे जाग्रति तद्विशिष्टज्ञानस्य साक्षिणाऽनुभूयमानत्वाभावेन संस्कारजन्याविद्यावृत्त्यैव सुषुप्तिविशिष्टज्ञानभानात् परामर्शत्वोपपत्तेः, केवलाज्ञानांशे तु तुल्यसामग्रीकत्वाद्वारावाहिकत्वमेव।

Here, it should be kept in mind that ajnAna-vritti is sattva-guNa-pariNAMA only because GIItA says - सत्त्वात् सञ्जायते ज्ञानम्. It is stated as tAmasI-vritti here only because it has tamas as the Alambana.

This is what VArtikakAra also says in BrihadAraNyaka BhAshya VArtika 3.4.103 - “न चेदनुभवव्याप्तिः सुषुप्तस्याभ्युपेयते । नावेदिषं सुषुप्तोऽहमिति धीः किंवालाद्भवेत् ॥” If you do not accept that ajnAna was experienced in sushupti, then how can there arise subsequent cognition in the form of “I did not know. I was asleep.”

However, in BrihadAraNyaka BhAshya VArtika, 1.4.300-301, a different position was taken vide the following:

न सुषुप्तिगविज्ञानं नाज्ञासिषमिति स्मृतिः । कालाद्यव्यवधानत्वान्न ह्यात्मस्थमतीतभाक् ॥

न भूतकालस्पृक्प्रत्यक् न चागामिस्पृगीक्षते । स्वार्थदेशः परार्थोऽथ विकल्पस्तेन स स्मृतः ॥

Here, the smriti of ajnAna is rejected by AchArya. BAlabOdhinI, page 1220 explains his intention as under: वार्तिककृतो निद्रावृत्तेः अङ्गीकार-अनङ्गीकार-योः अयमाशयः — उपनिषत् पुराणादिषु सुषुप्तेः दैनन्दिन-प्रलयत्वेन व्यवहारो वर्तते । अतः सुषुप्तेः प्रलय-साम्यं रक्षितुं कुत्रचित् निद्रावृत्तेः अनङ्गीकारो वार्तिककृतः । लौकिक-अनुभव-स्वारस्य-रक्षणार्थं निद्रावृत्तेः अङ्गीकारोऽपि वार्तिककारस्य युज्यते ।

In Upanishads and PurANas etc, at some places sushupti is described as pralaya. To illustrate the equivalence of sushupti and pralaya, VArtika, at some places, rejects the nidrA-vritti in sushupti whereas to explain the usual experience of sushupti, it does accept nidrA-vritti at other places.

In intention, there is no difference between VArtika and VivaraNa. Advaita Siddhi explains- विवरणकारैस्तु-‘अभावप्रत्ययालम्बना वृत्तिर्निद्रे’ति योगसूत्रानुसारेण तमोगुणात्मकावरणमात्रालम्बना काचिद्वृत्तिः सुषुप्तिरित्यभिप्रेत्य तदुपरक्तचैतन्यस्य तन्नाशेनैव नाशात्तत्कालीनाज्ञानानुभवजनितसंस्कारवशेन ‘न किञ्चिदवेदिष’मिति ‘स्मरणमभ्युपेत’मिति वार्तिकविवरणयोरप्यविरोधः ।

Thus, it is clear that saushupta-ajnAna-pratyaksha proves the bhAvarUpatva of ajnAna.

Rebuttal of jnAna-abhAva being object of parAmarsha

Objection: You had said that saushuptika-anubhava is imagined from the parAmarsha after waking up. And that saushuptika-anubhava is bhAvarUpa-ajnaAna-vishayaka. But I believe that this parAmarsha is in the nature of anumAna and not recollection. And this anumAna is with respect to jnAna-abhAva and not bhAvarUpa-ajnaAna. The anumAna is as under:

सुषुप्तिकालीनोऽहम् ज्ञानाभाववान्, अवस्थाविशेषवत्त्वात्; ज्ञानसामग्री-विरह-वत्त्वात्; ज्ञानवत्तया नियमेनास्मर्यमाणत्वात्।

Answer: Your argument uses the following as the component of anumAna:

Paksha = sushupti-kAlIna-AtmA

Hetu = avasthA-vishesha-vattvam OR jnAna-sAmagrI-viraha-vattvam OR jnAna-vat-tayA-niyamena-smaryamANatvam

sAdhya = jnAna-abhAva

Let us take each of the three one-by-one and see how your argument:

सुषुप्तिकालीनोऽहम् ज्ञानाभाववान्, अवस्थाविशेषवत्त्वात्

Before using this anumAna, you use another anumAna. You do this anumAna to arrive at sushupti-adhikaraNa-bhUta-kAla. It is not proved beforehand that there is some time during which sushupti lasts. However, everyone experiences sushupti involving a rise

(udaya) and set (asta). This udaya-asta is just like sUryOdaya-sUryAsta. And just as sUryOdaya-sUryAsta is universally accepted to have an antarAla between them, similarly sushupti would have an antarAla-kAla, a sushupti-adhikaraNa-bhUta-kAla. The anumAna is as under: विवाद-गोचरौ उदय-अस्त-मयौ अन्तराल-काल-वन्तौ, उदय-अस्त-मयत्वात्, सम्प्रतिपन्न-उदय-अस्त-मयवत्।

Now, once it is clear that sushupti has an adhikaraNa-bhUta-kAla, you are using the impugned anumAna to claim jnAna-abhAva: सुषुप्तिकालीनोऽहम् ज्ञानाभाववान्, अवस्थाविशेषवत्त्वात्. You hold that because sushupti is an avasthA-vishesha having jnAna-abhAva, hence sushupti has jnAna-abhAva.

सुषुप्तिकालीनोऽहम् ज्ञानाभाववान्, ज्ञानसामग्री-विरह-वत्त्वात्

Here, you are using jnAna-sAmagrI-viraha i.e. dissociation from jnAna-sAmagrI as the hetu. You hold that since sushupti has dissociation from jnAna-sAmagrI, sushupti has jnAna-abhAva.

सुषुप्तिकालीनोऽहम् ज्ञानाभाववान्, ज्ञानवत्तया नियमेनास्मर्यमाणत्वात्

Here, you hold that sushupti-kAlIna-AtmA is never recollected as possessed with jnAna. And hence, it is necessarily jnAna-abhAva in sushupti.

Objection: Absolutely. This is how I framed my arguments. These anumAna clearly show that one can have anumiti-pramA regarding jnAna-abhAva present in sushupti.

Answer: No. All the three anumAna are erroneous. It will be demonstrated. However, at the outset, it is clarified that we don't deny jnAna-abhAva in sushupti. On the contrary, we hold that sushupti is nikhil-jnAna-abhAva-rUpA. (By jnAna, here manO-vritti is meant). However, it cannot be inferred through the anumAna presented above. Rather it is inferred through arthApatti or vyatirekI-anumAna or anupalabdhi. That will be demonstrated subsequently. First, let us understand how the above-mentioned three anumAna are faulty. Since sushupti is jnAna-abhAva-rUpA, there cannot be hetu-jnAna or paksha-visheshaNā-jnAna (hetu as located in paksha). And without these two, no anumAna can even start for sushupti. This is the common rebuttal of all the three. Let us take the individual anumAna:

सुषुप्तिकालीनोऽहम् ज्ञानाभाववान्, अवस्थाविशेषवत्त्वात्

Here, one needs to appreciate that you have used the vyApti: यत्र यत्र अवस्था-विशेष-वत्त्वम्, तत्र तत्र ज्ञान-अभावः. However, jnAna-abhAva is the sAdhya here. Before the anumiti of sAdhya, this hetu-jnAna was not possible. From hetu-jnAna, there will arise sAdhya-jnAna, and in your case, for hetu-jnAna, there is a requirement of sAdhya-jnAna. So, it is a circular argument.

Similarly, vyApti-grahaNa is not possible either.

BAlabOdhinI explains on page 1202 and 1203 as under: पूर्वपक्षिणा अवस्थाविशेषवत्त्वमेव प्रथमहेतुतया उक्तम्, सुषुप्तपुरुषस्य अवस्थाविशेषवत्त्वं ज्ञानाभावव्यतिरेकेण निरूपयितुमशक्यम् ज्ञानाभाव एव सुषुप्तपुरुषस्य

अवस्थाविशेषः नान्यः । ज्ञानाभावस्तु प्रकृतानुमाने साध्यमेव । साध्यानुमितेः प्राक् अस्य हेतोर्ज्ञानमेव न सम्भवति ।

हेतुज्ञानात् साध्यानुमितिः साध्यानुमितौ हेतोर्ज्ञानमिति परस्परसापेक्षतया हेतोर्ज्ञानमेव न सिध्येत् । तथा च कथमनुमितिः ?

BAlabOdhinI quotes Advaita-DIpikA to illustrate that even though antarAla-kAla is proved through anumAna, it remains to be proved as to how it is the sushupti-adhikaraNa-bhUta-kAla. This is because sushupti is nikhila-jnAna-abhAva-rUpa and that is sAdhya. And prior to sAdhya-siddhi, paksha-visheshaNa-jnAna is impossible in the instant case. सुषुप्त्यधिकरणकालसिद्धये यदनुमानं प्रदर्शितं तेन उदयास्तमयान्तरालकालसिद्धौ अपि तस्य सुषुप्त्यधिकरणत्वं न सिद्धम् । निखिलज्ञानाभावरूपा सुषुप्तिः; सुषुप्तिकालीनोऽहम् इत्यस्य निखिलज्ञानाभावकालीनोऽहम् इत्यर्थः । एवंपक्षनिर्देशो न भवितुमर्हति निखिलज्ञानाभावस्यैव साध्यत्वात्, साध्यसिद्धेः प्राक् पक्षविशेषणज्ञानासम्भवात् ।

Since सुषुप्तिकालीनोऽहम् includes the adjective sushupti which is nikhila-jnAna-abhAva and is identical to sAdhya, before sAdhya-siddhi, this paksha qualified with visheshaNa cannot be known.

मूले पक्षविशेषणस्य अज्ञानादिति यदुक्तं तेन अनुमितेः प्राक् साध्यस्यापि अज्ञानं सूचितम्, साध्यस्यापि पक्षविशेषणत्वात् निखिलज्ञानाभावरूपसाध्यस्य अनुमितेः प्राक् असिद्धौ व्याप्तिग्रहस्थलाभावात्; व्याप्तिग्रह एव न सम्भवति, तेन अनुमानासम्भव एव । पक्षविशेषणपदेन साध्यमपि सूचितं मूले, सुषुप्तिनिखिलज्ञानाभावयोरेकत्वादिति भावः ।

सुषुप्तिकालीनोऽहम् ज्ञानाभाववान्, ज्ञानसामग्री-विरह-वत्त्वात्

In this case also, the hetu-jnAna is impossible without sAdhya-jnAna. That there was jnAna-sAmagrI-viraha in sushupti is known on account of sushupti being jnAna-abhAva.

Thus, there is a firm anyOnyAshraya-dOsha. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1203, explains the issue - सुषुप्तौ ज्ञानसामग्रीविरहः ज्ञानाभावेनैव अनुमातुं शक्यते, नान्यथा, योग्यायोग्यपदार्थघटिताज्ञानसामग्री अनुमानेन विना न निरूपयितुं शक्यते, अनुमानमपि ज्ञानाभावलिङ्गेनैव । तथा च सुदृढोऽन्योन्याश्रयः । सुषुप्तौ ज्ञानाभावानुमितौ तेनानुमितेन ज्ञानाभावेन ज्ञानसामग्रीविरहस्य अनुमितिः अनुमितेन ज्ञानसामग्रीविरहेण ज्ञानाभावानुमितिरिति ।

Objection: But jnAna-sAmagrI-viraha is not necessarily known only through anumAna where jnAna-abhAva is the hetu. After waking, there is indriya-prasAda. This leads to the conclusion that there was indriya-uparama during sushupti. Thus, indriya-prasAda is the hetu and indriya-uparama is the sAdhya. From this indriya-uparama, jnAna-sAmagrI-abhAva can be inferred. And then jnAna-abhAva can be inferred. Thus, there is no anyOnyAshraya.

Answer: Not so. The indriya-prasAda has sAkshi-swarUpa-sukha-anubhava as the hetu and not indriya-uparama. VivaraNa clarifies - सम्भवति च मुख्य एव स्वरूपानन्दानुभवः । ननु तदपि सुखमविद्यावृतं न प्रकाशमर्हति, न; अनावृतसाक्षिचैतन्यसुखांशस्य प्रकाशोपपत्तेः । जागरणे तर्हि किमिति नावभासते भासते एव परमप्रेमास्पदत्वलक्षणं सुखम्, तीव्रवायुविक्षिप्तप्रदीपप्रभावत् मिथ्याज्ञानविक्षिप्ततया न स्पष्टमवभासते, सुषुप्तौ तु तदभावादधिकं व्यज्यते इति॥

Further, indriya-prasAda does not necessarily imply indriya-uparama as there is vyabhichAra in the case of samAdhi and chitta-avyagratA-kAla.

Further, even though one assumes that indriya-prasAda can be inferred to lead to indriya-uparama, still, indriya-uparama does not imply jnAna-abhAva. In case of swapna, despite indriya-uparama, vishaya-jnAna and vishaya-jnAna-sAmagrI are there.

And if one argues about manasa-uparama as the hetu for jnAna-sAmagrI-abhAva, then even that has vyabhichAra in the case of shObhana-swapna.

Accordingly, it is clear that jnAna-sAmagrI-viraha-vattva is not a correct hetu to infer jnAna-abhAva.

सुषुप्तिकालीनोऽहम् ज्ञानाभाववान्, ज्ञानवत्तया नियमेनास्मर्यमाणत्वात्

This anumAna is also faulty on account of hetu-vyabhichAra. It has vyabhichAra in case of upekshaNIya-jnAna such as jnAna of grass etc while walking. In such cases, even where there is hetu, there is no sAdhya. The rule is that upekshaNIya-jnAna does not result in samskAra and hence it is mandatorily not remembered as having jnAna. However, there is no jnAna-abhAva as upekshaNIya-jnAna was pretty much present. BALabOdhinI, p. 1204, says - उपेक्षात्मक-ज्ञानस्य संस्कार-अजनकत्वात् तथा च उपेक्षात्मक-ज्ञानवत्-तया नियमेन-अस्मर्यमाणेऽपि आत्मनि उपेक्षात्मक-ज्ञान-अभावो न सिध्येत् । Since there is hetu-vyabhichAra, the anumAna is erroneous.

Mechanics of knowledge of jnAna-abhAva

Objection: If ज्ञानवत्तया नियमेनास्मर्यमाणत्वात् is not accepted as the hetu to arrive at the sAdhya of jnAna-abhAva, then how exactly do we come to know of jnAna-abhAva.

In fact, it is easily understood by our experience also. In the morning, I experienced the courtyard. Now, in the evening, I don't recollect the elephant but I recollect the courtyard. Had there been elephant-experience, I would have recollected the elephant, just as I recollect courtyard. Thus, from samaraNa-abhAva, I infer samryamANa-abhAva. Just as you hold upalabhya-abhAva from upalabdhi-abhAva. Basically, since गज-ज्ञान-वत्-तया नियमेन-अस्मर्यमाणत्व is present, and hence गज-ज्ञान-अभाव (of morning) is being inferred. If this is not accepted, then गज-ज्ञान-अभाव (of morning) cannot be inferred.

Answer: Not so. As already demonstrated, this anumAna is defective on account of hetu-vyabhichAra. The mechanics of knowing jnAna-abhAva is different. It is through anupalabdhi-pramANa or through vyatikrI-anumAna/arthaApatti-pramANa.

Wherever there is ajnAna, there is jnAna-anupalabdhi. That is to say, there is jnAna-upalabdhi-abhAva. For e.g. if there is elephant-ajnAna, there is no upalabdhi of elephant-jnAna. This is proved through following anumAna:

यत्र यत्र अज्ञानम्, तत्र तत्र ज्ञान-अनुपलब्धिः; यत्रैवं तत्रैवम्; यथा गजज्ञान-अनुपलब्धि-अभाव-वति मयि (गजज्ञान-उपलब्धि-वति मयि) गज-अज्ञान-स्य अभावः अस्ति (गज-ज्ञानम् अस्ति).

Through this anumAna, we come to understand that ajnAna, working as hetu, leads to anumiti of jnAna-anupalabdhi as sAdhya.

Now, this jnAna-anupalabdhi leads to anupalabdhi-pramA of jnAna-abhAva. Just as

table-anupalabdhi leads to the parOksha-pramA of table-abhAva, similarly jnAna-anupalabdhi leads to parOksha-pramA of jnAna-abhAva.

Or else, you can directly use vyatirekI-anumAna to arrive at jnAna-abhAva:

यत्र यत्र अज्ञानम्, तत्र तत्र ज्ञानाभावः; यन्नैवं तन्नैवम्; यथा गजज्ञानाभाव-अभाव-वति मयि (गजज्ञान-वति मयि)
गज-अज्ञान-स्य अभावः अस्ति (गज-ज्ञानम् अस्ति).

This is what is explained in BAlabOdhinI, p. 1206 -साक्षिसिद्धेन अज्ञानेन उपलब्धेरभावोऽनुमीयते, इति न अनवस्थागन्धोऽपि । साक्षिसिद्धेन भावभूत-अज्ञानेन अनुमित उपलब्ध्यभावः उपलब्ध्याभावं बोधयति । This is how objection against anupalabdhi-pramANa is also responded. [One may argue that x-upalabdhi-abhAva is stated to lead to x-abhAva. But, how is x-upalabdhi-abhAva ascertained? Does it require x-upalabdhi-upalabdhi-abhAva? Then it will lead to infinite regress. That is responded - x-upalabdhi-abhAva is inferred from x-ajnaAna. If there is x-ajnaAna, there has to be x-upalabdhi-abhAva through the vyatirekI-anumAna. And then anupalabdhi-pramANa will operate.]

Or else, one can directly hold jnAna-abhAva as vyApaka and ajnaAna as vyApya. BAlabOdhinI, on the same page, says - भावरूप-अज्ञानं ज्ञानाभाव-व्याप्यम्-इत्युक्तमेव । भावरूप-अज्ञानेन ज्ञानाभाव-अनुमानप्रयोगं दर्शयति "पूर्वकाले प्रातरित्यर्थः, प्रातः कालीनोऽहम्, गजज्ञानाभाव-वान्, गज-अज्ञान-वत्त्वात्"। ज्ञानाभाव-व्याप्य-अज्ञानवत्त्वादित्यर्थः । अन्वय-व्याप्तेः असंभवात् व्यतिरेक-व्याप्तिं दर्शयति — यन्नैवं तन्नैवमिति । यदा मयि साध्यं नास्ति तदा हेतुरपि नास्ति, यथा गजज्ञानवति मयीति । यदाऽहं गजज्ञानवान् तदा मयि साध्याभावो गजज्ञानाभाव-अभावो वर्तते एवं हेत्वभावोऽपि गज-अज्ञान-अभावोऽपि वर्तते । साध्याभाव-

व्यापकीभूतहेत्वभावप्रतियोगित्वरूपा व्यतिरेकव्याप्तिः हेतौ वर्तते । अतः सर्वत्र भावभूत-अज्ञानेन व्याप्येन ज्ञानाभावस्य व्यापकस्य अनुमितिर्भवतीति भावः ।

Thus, in the case of sushupti, from the bhAvarUpa-ajnaAna-pratyaksha, there is anumiti/arthApatti-pramA of jnaAna-abhAva in sushupti. VivaraNa says on p. 170 - एवमुत्थितस्य ज्ञानाभावपरामर्शोऽपि ज्ञानविरोधिनोऽज्ञानस्यानुभूततया स्मर्यमाणस्यानुपपत्त्यैव प्रमीयते नानुस्मर्यते।

This entire issue is succinctly dealt with in Advaita Siddhi, p. 1205 -न च तर्हि प्रातरनुभूतचत्वरे गजज्ञानाभावज्ञानं कथमिति वाच्यम् ; ज्ञानानुपलब्ध्यैवेत्यवेहि । अनुपलब्धिज्ञानं च भावरूपाज्ञानेन लिङ्गेन । तथा हि-पूर्वकालेऽहं, गजज्ञानाभाववान्, गजाज्ञानवत्त्वात् , यन्नैवं तन्नैवम् , यथा गजज्ञानवानहमिति, एवं सर्वत्राज्ञानस्य ज्ञानाभावव्याप्यत्वेन तदनुमापकत्वम् ।

Objection: If in order to do the anumAna of jnaAna-abhAva, you need to have a jnaAna-virOdhi-vastu as the hetu, then in order to do the anumAna of rAga-abhAva in sushupti, you need to admit dvesha in sushupti!

Answer: That is not required. Because bhAvarUpa-ajnaAna or jnaAna-abhAva itself being contradictory to rAga would suffice to result in anumAna of rAga-abhAva. Presence of dvesha is not required. Advaita Siddhi, p. 1206, says - न च-सुषुप्तिकाले ज्ञानाभावानुमानार्थं भावरूपाज्ञानमिव रागाभावानुमानार्थं द्वेषोऽपि स्वीकरणीयः, तद्विरोधिपदार्थानुभवं विना तदभावानुमानायोगादिति वाच्यम्; भावरूपाज्ञानेन ज्ञानाभावेन वा रागाभावानुमानसंभवात् , तस्यापि तद्विरोधित्वात् । Basically, since in sushupti, there is sarva-vishaya-vyAvritta-ajnaAna which leads to nikhila-jnaAna-abhAva.

Once there is nikhila-jnAna-abhAva, logically, there would be rAga-abhAva, ichchhA-abhAva etc as well. No other hetu is required therefor.

Objection: Well, in case there is aparOksha-jnAna, then there cannot be ajnAna as ajnAna is destroyed by aparOksha-jnAna. And yet there is seen to be parOksha-jnAna-abhAva. Since you hold that ajnAna is the hetu and jnAna-abhAva is the sAdhya, then how do you explain parOksha-jnAna-abhAva in this case?

Answer: In such a case, parOksha-jnAna-abhAva is the sAdhya and parOksha-jnAna-sAmagrI-viraha is the hetu. And there is no anyOnyAshraya-dOsha here as earlier stated because the parOksha-jnAna-sAmagrI-viraha can be known through anupalabdhi-pramANa, and there is no requirement of parOksha-jnAna-abhAva-jnAna. In the earlier case when we rejected that possibility in sushupti, there was no question of operation of anupalabdhi-pramANa in sushupti. And hence jnAna-abhAva was required to be known beforehand for knowing jnAna-sAmagrI-viraha. Hence, there was anyOnyAshraya-dOsha.

Advaita Siddhi clarifies this on p. 1207 - अथापरोक्षतो ज्ञातेऽज्ञानाभावात् कथं परोक्षज्ञानाभावानुमानम् ? सामग्रीविरहादिनेति गृहाण । न चात्राप्यन्योन्याश्रयः; शब्दादीनां योग्यानां योग्यानुपलब्ध्या अभावनिश्चयेन परोक्षज्ञानविरहज्ञानं विनैव सामग्रीविरहनिश्चयात् , सुषुप्तिकाले चेन्द्रियादिघटितसामग्रीविरहस्य फलाभावं विना ज्ञातुमशक्यत्वेनान्योन्याश्रयोक्तेः।

Mechanics as per VPS and Advaita DIpikA

VivaraNa Prameya Sangraha, p. 54, says - अस्मन्मते तु साक्षिवेद्यो ज्ञान-मात्र-अभावः।

ज्ञान-विशेष-अभावः तु 'व्यवहारे भट्टनयः' इति-अभ्युपगमेन षष्ठ-मान-गम्यः।

Advaita DIpikA, vol. 2, p. 145-147 states - अस्मत्-अभिमत-अज्ञानं तु सुषुप्तौ अपि विषय-व्यावृत्तम्-एव अनुभूयते। विषयस्य अपि अज्ञाततया नित्य-अनुभव-मात्र-वेद्यत्वात्। न चैवं जागरण इव 'अहमज्ञो घटं न जानामि' इति प्रत्ययप्रसङ्ग इति वाच्यम्। तदा अज्ञान-साक्षिणः सविकल्पकता-आपादक-अहंकारस्य-अभावेन तथा-अननुभवात्।

किञ्च सुषुप्तौ ज्ञानादि-अभावो अपि साक्षिणा अनुभवितुं शक्यते। न च एवं तदा अज्ञानादि-असिद्धि प्रसङ्गः। तस्य तदा अपि आवश्यकत्वेन जाग्रति इव 'न अवेदिषम्' इति अनुभवस्य तदेकविषयत्वात्।

The crux of the issue is as under. No matter what the vastu is, it is always sAkshi-bhAsya. However, only-vastu or only-ajnAna is never sAkshi-bhAsya. jnAtatva-vishishTa-vastu or ajnAtatva-vishishTa-vastu is sAkshi-bhAsya. Now, sushupti is sarva-vishaya-vyAvritta-ajnAna-anubhUti as we recollect - I did not know anything. Means, the ajnAna experienced in sushupti was vishaya-vyAvritta. However, since the objects were ajnAtatayA-sAkshi-vedya and there was no ahamkAra, there is no experience in the form of "I don't know a pot". Similarly, jnAna-abhAva as a visheshaNa of ajnAna is experienced by sAkshI ajnAtatayA in sushupti.

In jAgrat, the past jnAna-abhAva is known through arthApatti/vyatirekI-anumAna.

Thus, present jnAna-vishesha-abhAva can be known by vyatirekI-anumAna/arthApatti/anupalabdhi (as demonstrated earlier). Present

jñAna-mAtra-abhAva cannot be known by pramANa, as there is no antah-karANa.

However, it can be known by sAkshI ajñAtatayA, just as sAkshI knows any other vishaya.

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